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APPiAiB ITy Op STATE BAN CoLLECTION CODE TO INSOLVENT NATIONAL BANKS
PREFEanED claims against the assets of insolvent national banks are prohibited by
the provision in the National Bank Act' which requires that the assets of such in-
solvents shall be ratably distributed to all those creditors who have demonstrated to
the satisfaction of the receiver the validity of their claims. This clause was designed,
however, to control the distribution of only those assets to which the bank can claim
title at insolvency.2 Thus property held in trust by the bank, if it can be identified
and traced into the hands of the receiver, is not properly an asset in which general
creditors are entitled to share, but is one to be returned intact to the cestui que trust.3
The equitable doctrine of constructive trust likewise has been employed by the
federal courts in national bank cases to justify preferred treatment of a claimant
whose property has been wrongfully and fraudulently converted by the bank to its
own use.4 So when a bank accepts a deposit or the proceeds of a collection item after
committing an act of insolvency, the funds thereby received become impressed with
a trust, and if traced into the hands of the receiver, are recoverable by their rightful
owners.5 The doctrine of constructive trust has found frequent application also in
those cases where the bank, as agent for collection, has become insolvent before re-
mitting to the owner the proceeds of an item upon which payment has been received
from the drawee.6 It has been invoked by the federal courts in such cases in order
to establish that the fiduciary relationship between the collecting bank and the
owner continues until remittance and in order to prepare the way for preferred
treatment of the claimant if his collection proceeds could be properly identified.7
But before a preferred claim could be granted in the federal courts, claimant was
required to abide by two rules for identifying his property in the hands of the re-
ceiver. He had the burden of proving first, that the collection transaction resulted
in an augmentation of a particular fund included in the bank's assets, or that the
1. 13 STAT. 114 (1863), 12 U. S. C. A. § 194 (1926); Cook County National Bank v.
United States, 107 U. S. 445 (1882) ; 13 Att. Gen. Op. 5238 (1871).
2. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499 (1892).
3. Capital National Bank v. First National Bank of Cadiz, 172 U. S. 425 (1899).
4. Townsend, Constructive Trusts and Bank Collections (1930) 39 Y,%Tx L. J. 950.
5. Quin v. Earle, 95 Fed. 728 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1899); First National Bank of Ventura v.
Williams, 15 F. (2d) 585 (E. D. N. C. 1926); St Augustine Paint Co. v. McNair, 59 F.
(2d) 755 (S. D. Fla. 1932).
6. American Can Co. v. Williams, 178 Fed. 420 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1910); Spolmne & East-
ern Trust Co. v. U. S. Steel Products Co., 290 Fed. 884 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); L:arab2e
Flour Mills v. First National Bank, 13 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Ellerbe v. Stu-
debaker Corporation of America, 21 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927); Burnes National
Bank of St. Joseph v. Spurway, 28 F. (2d) 40 (S. D. Iowa, 1928); Townsend, op. cit.
supra, note 4.
7. Determination of the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties is pre-
requisite to the finding of constructive trust and the consequent grant of a preferred claim.
Many courts hold that only the debtor-creditor relation arises when the bank collects an
item, on the theory that the bank was justified by common banking practice in inter-
mingling the collection proceeds with its own funds and remitting on the item with its own
draft. See First National Bank v. Williams, 15 F. (2d) 585 (E. D. N. C. 1926); Bogert,
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proceeds were segregated by themselves, 8 and second, that the augmented fund or the
segregated proceeds came into the hands of the receiver.0 It was not sufficient
simply to show that the claimant's property, when received, swelled the value of the
bank's general assets because claimant's property might have been dissipated by the
bank before insolvency, in which case it was said that no res was held by the receiver
to which a trust could attach.10 Hence, when a collecting bank collected an item
through the clearing house and became insolvent before remitting payment thereon
to the owner, a preferred claim would be denied by the federal courts on the grounds
that the proceeds of the collection item, employed as they were to discharge the
collecting bank's indebtedness, never reached the hands of the receiver.11 But if
the balance at the clearing house on the day the item was cleared should be in
favor of the collecting bank, the court would grant a preference on the presumption
that this favorable balance received from the clearing house was payment on the
claimant's collection item and constituted an augmentation of the assets held by the
receiver for distribution.' 2 Likewise in a second situation where the collecting bank
collected an item from one of its own depositors by receiving a check drawn on
that deposit, a preferred claim would be denied on the ground that no trust res
could arise from a "mere shifting of liabilities."'' 3
Failed Banks, Collection Items and Trust Preferences (1931) 29 Micu. L. Rrv. 545, Com-
ment (1932) 6 Tu_.LaN L. REv. 643; (1926) 75 U. or PA. L. REV. 69. But other courts
apply the constructive trust reasoning and hold that the bank was authorized to accept
payment on an item only in cash. By accepting payment in other medium than cash and
by intermingling the proceeds of the item with its own funds the bank has thereby
breached its fiduciary relationship with the consequence that the collection proceeds are
impressed with a trust and are recoverable by the owner if they can be identified. Sea
(1927) 22 ILL. L. Rv. 205, and cases cited note 6, supra. It is further argued by those
courts who wish to preserve this agency relationship, that such a relationship, being ex con-
tractu and requiring consent of both parties, can not be changed into the relation of
debtor-creditor at the whim of the collecting agent. Holder v. Western German Bank,
136 Fed. 90 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905). For discussion of allocation of risk of collecting agent
bank's insolvency see Townsend, Bank Deposits of Commercial Paper (1929) 7 N. Y. U. L,
Q. REv. 293, 618; Turner, Deposits of Demand Paper As "Purchases" (1928) 37 YALE L. J,
874.
8. Farmer's National Bank v. Pribble, 15 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Dudley v,
Richards, 18 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); First National Bank v. City of Miami, 69
F. (2d) 346 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
9. See Townsend, Tracing Technique in Bank Preference Cases (1933) 7 U. or CINe.
L. Ray. 201; Empire State Surety Co. v. Carroll County, 194 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 8th,
1912); Cuttell v. Fluent, 51 F. (2d) 974 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); St. Augustine Paint Co. v.
McNair, 59 F. (2d) 755 (S. D. Fla. 1932).
10. American Can Co. v. Williams, 178 Fed. 420 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1910); In re See, 209
Fed. 172 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1913); Weurpel v. Commercial Germania Trust and Savings Bank,
238 F. 269 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917); Blumenfeld v. Union Nat. Bank, 38 F. (2d) 455 (C. C.
A. 10th, 1930).
11. First National Bank v. Williams, 15 F. (2d) 585 (E. D. N. C. 196); Farmer's
National Bank v. Pribble 15 F. (2d) 175, (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Rorebeck v. Benedict
Flour Co., 26 F. (2d) 440 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Burnes Nat. Bank of St. Joseph, Mo. v,
Spurway, 28 F. (2d) 40 (S. D. Iowa 1928).
12. Nyssa-Arcadia Drainage District v. First National Bank, 3 F. (2d) 648 (D. Ore.
1925); People's National Bank v. Moore, 25 F. (2d) 599 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
13. Beard v. Independent District of Pela City, 88 F. 375 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898); Lara-
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These legal prerequisites to obtaining a preference on collection items from the
receiver of a national bank, although in accord with the traditional trust concepts, 14
necessarily led, in application, to fortuitous and haphazard results, and for this reason
have been departed from by many state courts and criticized by many commenta-
tors.35 In the above situations, where the federal courts would have been unable
to discover a trust res, some state courts would allow a preference on the theory that
the collecting bank has really realized an augmentation of its assets. This conclusion
is based on the fictional reasoning that when the drawee, a regular depositor, pays the
draft with a check drawn on his account in the collecting bank, he in effect has
withdrawn the amount of the check in cash from his account and then paid it back
to the bank on the draft over the counter; in that case there would be an obvious
augmentation of the bank's funds.' 6 Similarly, in the clearance transaction some
state courts would find an augmentation on the theory that, in effect, the bank had
paid its debt in cash and received cash in return payment. 17 State courts have not
been at all consistent, however, in their manner of handling these claims for pre-
ferences, some granting them without any evidence of a desire to abide by the rules
of identifying the res,18 while others have proceeded along a course of reasoning as
strict as that pursued by the federal courts.' 0 In order to settle some of the con-
fusion in the decisions and to bring about some uniformity the American Bankers
Association framed a Bank Collection Code, adopted by eighteen states, -:0 and
bee Flour Mills v. First National Bank, 13 Fed. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. Sth, 1926); Rorebeclk
v. Benedict Flour & Feed Co., 26 F. (2d) 440 (C. C. A. Sth, 192); Hirning v. Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 52 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); Allied Millb v. Hor-
ton, 65 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933); Lifsey v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co, 67
F. (2d) 82 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
14. Infra, note 36.
15. Comment (1927) 36 Y=x: L. J. 6S2, 686; Comment (1930) 40 Y=us L. J. 456;
(1929) 14 St. Lois L. Rv. 406; cf. Faris, dissenting in Larabee Flour AMl v. First
National Bank 13 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
16. State National Bank v. First National Bank, 124 Ark. 531, 187 S. W. 673 (1916);
Sinclair Refining Co. v. T erney, 33 N. M. 498, 270 Pac. 792 (1923); People of the State
of New York v. City Bank of Rochester, 96 N. Y. 32 (1884); Kansas Flour Mills Co. v.
New State Bank of Woodward, 124 Okla. 185, 256 Pac. 43 (1926); Federal Reserve Bank
v. Peters, 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E. 379 (1924); See also (1932) 16 Mnm. L. Rzv. 348.
17. Kansas State Bank v. First State Bank, 62 Kan. 788, 64 Pac. 634 (1901).
18. People v. Bates, 351 Ill. 439, 184 N. E. 597 (1933); Eastman v. Farmer's State
Bank of Olivia, 175 Minn. 336, 221 N. W. 236 (1928); State v. Farmer's State Bank of
Polk, 121 Neb. 532, 237 N. W. 857 (1931); First National Bank & Trust Co. of Ashville
v. Hood, 204 N. C. 351, 168 S. E. 528 (1933); Nichols v. Bank of Syracuse, 220 Mo. App.
1019, 278 S. W. 793 (1925); Rice v. Columbia, 144 S. C. 147, 142 S. E. 239 (1923); see
(192S) 13 Afmnn. L. Rav. 39.
19. Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co, 242 ass. 181, 136 X.
E. 333 (1922); Zimmerli v. Northern Bank and Trust Co., 111 Wash. 624, 191 Pac. 783
(1920). See Comment (1934) 43 YArx L. J. 794 for discussion of the various typas of
priorities allowed by state courts in the assets of insolvent banks. For collection of authori-
ties see 82 A. L. R. 1.
20. For detailed criticism of this Code see Townsend, The Bank Collection Code of the
American Banker's Association (1933) 8 Tuoasm L. liv. 21, 236, 376, and for list of
states which have adopted it see same article, footnote 3. See also Wallace, Uniform Checr
Collection Code (1930), 16 ViRGuNA L. REv. 792.
The Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has exhaustively conAdered
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authorizing the bank, as collection agent for the owner of the item, to collect
through the clearing house or by receiving in payment checks drawn on its own ac-
counts. The agency relationship is therein declared not to terminate at collection but
to continue until the proceeds have been received by the owner. The Code further
provides that the bank's assets shall be impressed with a trust in favor of the owner
when an item is collected and that the owner thereof shall receive a preferred claim
if the bank should fail before remittance, irrespective of whether the proceeds repre-
senting such item can be traced and identified.
21
Two recent Federal Circuit Court decisions raise the question before the Supreme
Court as to the applicability of the Bank Collection Code to national banks in 5o far
as it purports to grant preferred claims against the assets of insolvent banks to owners
of collection items when collections have been made thereon before insolvency. In
a case before the Second Circuit,2 2 the plaintiff was the owner of a promissory note,
payable at the office of the defendant, which he deposited for collection in his bank
in Philadelphia. The note was sent by the depository to the Chase National, and
from there through the Federal Reserve to the defendant in Mamaroneck for collec-
tion from the maker. The maker, having an account with the defendant, paid the
note with a check on that account. Immediately after receiving payment of the note
and before remittance of the proceeds the defendant became insolvent and a receiver
was appointed. The plaintiff filed claim for a preference on the ground that the
Bank Collection Code specifically provides for a preferred claim under the circum-
stances of this case.23 In denying this claim the court cited federal cases which
held that no trust results from a transaction such as that in the instant case,13 and
declared state legislation to be unavailing, if contrary to the act of Congress as con-
strued by the federal courts. In a case before the Eighth Circuit,24 the plaintiff,
situated in Indianapolis, deposited in its local bank for collection a check drawn on
the Gary State Bank. This check, which passed in the usual manner from the
depository to the Fletcher American National Bank in Indianapolis, and thence to
the defendant, a correspondent of the Fletcher Bank in Gary, was collected from
the drawee by the defendant through the Gary Clearing House. The balance for the
day was against the defendant, so it was required to make the clearing house whole.
Thereafter, but before its draft, sent to the Fletcher Bank in payment of the col-
lection item, could be cashed, the defendant became insolvent and a receiver was
appointed. Plaintiff's claim for a preference was sustained by the court on the
ground that the Bank Collection Code,25 being not in conflict with any federal act,
is applicable to national banks.
National banks are subject to state law except when their effectiveness as agencies
of the government is impaired by that law or when that law contravenes some Federal
the legal problems arising out of bank collections and a Uniform Bank Collection Act,
resulting therefrom and prepared by Professor Roscoe Steffen, is now in its fifth draft.
See HANDBooK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENcE OF Coam ssioNERs ON UMN=ORx STATi .
LAWS (1931); (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 125.
21. George F. Malcolm v. Burlington City Loan & Trust, 170 Atl. 32 (N. J. 1934);
Reichert v. Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 261 Mich. 107, 245 N. W. 808 (1932); Prudden
& Co. v. First National Bank of Secanus, 170 A. 860 (1934).
22. Old Company's Lehigh, Inc. v. Meeker, 71 F. (2d) 280 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1934).
23. NEW YORK NEGOTIABLE INsTRUM£ENTs LAW, § 350-a.
24. National Bank v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 71 F. (2d) 618 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1934).
25. INDIANA UNIFoRM BANK COLL-CTION CODE, §§ 1, 2, 9, 10; Indiana Laws 1929, c.
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Act.2 6 Thus claimants in both principal cases argued that there was no conflict
between the Federal Act which governs national banks at insolvency and the Bank
Collection Code since the latter statute purports to regulate national banks only in
their relations with their customers in matters of contract before insolvency occurs.
Prior to the enactment of the Code, when a bank was regarded as having breached
its fiduciary relationship by collecting an item through the clearing house or by re-
ceiving in payment a check drawn on one of its own accounts, on the theory that it
had authorization to collect only in cash, it became liable to the owner as debtor
because the bank realized no augmentation of assets from either transaction which
could be the basis of a trust or a preferred claim. 27 But the Code especially pro-
vides that the bank may collect in the aforementioned ways without becoming liable
as debtor and in so doing it alters the legal effect of those transactions in such a way
that an augmentation can be said to result therefrom to justify such a claim. Under
the Code, the cancellation of credits in the clearing house or the receipt of checks
drawn upon the collecting bank, each in payment of the collection item, is designated
as the authorized proceeds of the collection transaction. Hence the owner of the
collection item becomes the owner of the authorized proceeds thus presumed to be
released as cash funds when the credit cancellations or the checks are charged to
their respective accounts. The funds released, it is argued, constitute the augmenta-
tion of the bank's assets and should justify the courts in granting the preferred claim.
The Code, then, does not change the federal court requirement that there must be
an identifiable trust res before a preference will be granted, nor does it infringe
upon the ground covered by the National Bank Act.2  The Code purports only to
alter the legal effect of the collection transaction, by prescribing different rules of
contract; it concerns the bank only as a solvent operating company. The fact that
an augmentation of the bank's assets results from the changed legal relations between
bank and customer when none was apparent under the pre-existing federal court rules
is not enough to invalidate the state law in the absence of a conflict between that law
and some Federal Act.29
26. It is not clear how far state legislatures may go in regulating national banks. Waite
v. Dowley, 94 U. S. 527 (1876). See for eamples: First National Bank v. California, 262
U. S. 366 (1923) (statute providing that bank deposits shall eacheat to the state after
lying unclaimed for twenty years held inapplicable to National Banks); First National
Bank v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640 (1924) (statute prohibiting branch banking held not in
conflict with Federal Act); Easton v. Iowa, 18S U. S. 220 (1903) (officers of National
Banks not subject to state criminal penalties for accepting deposits after committing an
act of insolvency); Dakin v. Bayly, 290 U. S. 143 (1933) (statute which provides that
agency relation between owner of item and collecting bank shall continue until receipt
of proceeds thereon held applicable to National Banks); Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank,
161 U. S. 275 (1896) (statute granting preferred claims to savings banks in the event that
other banks wherein they kept deposits should become insolvent, held to conflict with
National Bank Act). See also Farmers' National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29 (1375);
McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U. S. 347 (1896); Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co, 54 S. Ct.
848 (U. S. 1934); Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160 (1924).
27. Supra, notes 11, 12, 13.
28. It is not disputed that the Code eliminates all tracing requirements for state courts.
See cases cited note 21, supra. It has the effect, then, of granting preferred daims out-
right against the assets of insolvent state banks, and at the same time of creating an aug-
mentation which will satisfy the federal rules.
29. Compare Earle v. Pennsylvania, 178 U. S. 449 (1900); Thompson v. Fairbanks, 193
U. S. 516 (1905); Steel v. Randall, 19 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
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The opposing contention can not be overlooked, however, that the federal courts'
decisions which declared the conditions for allowing preferred claims against the
assets of insolvent national banks were really interpretations of the clause in the
National Bank Act requiring ratable distribution of assets. Those courts employed
the generally accepted doctrines of constructive trust to determine what were not
assets comprehended by the National Bank Act. In so doing they defined by de-
limitation what were assets under the Act, and interpreted thereby the meaning of
the Act as to "assets." Since to change the trust requirements would be to change
the interpretations of what are assets under the Act, a state statute which attempted
to change the requirements already enunciated by the federal courts for a con-
structive trust, would be in conflict with the federal Act as construed by the federal
courts.30 It does not appear anomolous that these federal requirements for identify-
ing the trust res in the hands of the receiver should be crystalized and protected
from alteration by state legislatures if the constructive trust concept is regarded as
little more than a rationalization used by the courts to explain their finding that
certain operative facts take the proceeds of the collection item outside the meaning
of the word "assets" under the National Bank Act. Viewed in this light it is hardly
arguable that state legislatures should be permitted, under the pretense of exercising
their power to alter trust relationships, arbitrarily to enlarge the classes of operative
facts which create a trust res. Indeed if this were permitted, state legislatures could
expand the class of non-assets indiscriminately and thereby achieve, in effect, the
grant of preferred claims against insolvent National Banks.
The Bank Collection Code illustrates precisely this attempt. From its language
it is clear that the Code was designed to circumvent the settled law in the federal
courts as to trusts and to allow preferred claims, regardless of all tracing rules.
A preferred claim would have been permitted by the federal courts in neither of the
situations presented by the principal cases for the reason that in each case the bank
had received no money or funds from the outside to which a trust could attach,81
Under the Code, in exactly the same situations, preferred claims would be allowed.
The Code declared a new trust res by enacting the fictions that the collecting bank
has really received cash from the clearing house as payment on its collection items
and that it has received cash in accepting payment by a check drawn on itself; this
cash so received constituting the augmentation which fulfils the federal requirements
for preferred claims. If this statute is held applicable to national banks, the pos-
sibility for state legislatures to undermine the provision for ratable dividends in the
National Bank Act becomes almost unlimited. Legislatures would merely have to
declare any fund or item handled by the banks to be a trust res without any regard
for the orthodox rules for identifying the res in order to give to the owner thereof a
preference on distribution.32
30. Old Company's Lehigh, Inc. v. Meeker, supra note 22 at p. 282. If the Second Cir-
cuit Court's position, that the Federal rules of tracing the trust res are part and parcel
of the National Banking Act, is upheld, then an interesting speculation is presented as to
whether those state court decisions are unconstitutional which have refused to apply Fed-
eral rules of tracing when treating National Bank insolvencies. See Central National Bank
of Lincoln v. First National Bank of Gering 115 Neb. 444, 216 N. W. 302 (1927).
31. See notes 10, 11, 13, supra.. In Blakey v. Brinson, 286 U. S. 254, 263 (1932) Mr.
Justice Stone said, "The cancellation of the credit balance by the debit balance neither sug-
gests any intention to establish a trust nor points to any identifiable thing which could
be the subject of it." See Comment (1932) 6 Tur.ANE L. REv. 643.
32. Statutes in some states provide that when a bank receives an item for collection
its assets at once become impressed with a lien in favor of the owner of the item, and that
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When confronted with the Bank Collection Code which thus threatens to nullify
the ratable distribution provision in the National Bank Act, the Supreme Court has
available two recourses.33 The first would be to declare that the federal courts in
passing on preferred claims are in effect construing the National Bank Act; con-
sequently that state legislation which purports to alter the federal rules as to when
preferred claims will be allowed is in conflict with the Act as construed by the
federal courts.22 The second judicial remedy would not so drastically preclude the
power of a state legislature to define what constitutes a constructive trust, but would
restrict its exercise in affecting the provisions of the National Bank Act. In merely
using the constructive trust for the purpose of clothing an outright grant of a pre-
ferred claim in seemingly justifiable language the state legislature is obviously over-
reaching itself.34 The instant cases afford a good opportunity to distinguish and
condemn such a practice. The creation of the trust res under the Code is an obvious
subterfuge to accomplish a preference hitherto uniformly denied by the federal
courts; the fictions enacted to create the trust res have been uniformly rejected by
the federal courts when urged by private parties35 and comprise a radical departure
from the established principles of trusts.30 Preferred claims not only are allowed
under the Code without regard to whether there is an actual trust res, but they are
allowed out of any assets which the bank might possess at insolvency,3T including
the bank building itself, assets not even remotely related to the proceeds of the col-
lection item. Thus the court might well refuse to apply the Code on the ground that,
looking through form to substance, this statute was an attempt to create new pre-
ferences subversive of the National Bank Act. The willingness of the Eighth Circuit
Court to disregard this substantial conflict between the Code and the National Bank
Act and to give credence to a logomachous rationalization is perhaps explicable by the
cumbersome legal difficulties which could be eliminated by applying the state statutes
to National Banks.38  Moreover, the policy of granting preferred claims, without
resort to ancient trust doctrines has, to say the least, considerable intrinsic merit.39
in case of insolvency a preferred claim will be granted to the owner. The problem as to
whether such a statute is applicable to National Banks arose in Royal Mfg. Co. v. Spmdlin
6 F. Supp. 98 (D. C. M. D. 1934), now pending before the Circuit Court on appeial
One apparent purpose of the ratable distribution clause is to insure uniformity of treat-
ment for all national banks. Cook County National Bank v. United States, 107 U. S. 445
(1882). If it were permissable for every state legislature to change the legal effect of
everyday transactions and thereby indirectly to grant preferred claims against national
banks, the law as to distribution of assets at insolvency would soon be in utter confusion.
Cf. Texas and Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, 54 Sup. Ct. 416, (U. S. 1934).
33. Certiorari has been granted on both the principal cases, U. S. La. Week, Oct. 9,
1934, at 102.
34. Infra, note 36.
35. Allied Ails v. Horton, 65 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933); Larabee Flour Ml
v. First National Bank 13 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (Faris, J., dis-enting).
36. BOGERT, TRus s (1921) 527-534; Stone, Some Legal Problems Involved in the Tran-
mission of Funds (1921) 21 CoL. L. REv. 507; Townsend, supra, note 20 at 3S8-391;
Townsend, supra note 4.
37. Townsend, supra note 20.
38. Turner, Bank Collections-The Direct Routing Practice (1929) 39 Y,= L. J. 46S;
Comment (1932) 30 McH. L. REv. 491; Comment (1931) 40 YA. L. J. 456.
39. Turner, supra note 38. But for other views as to where the rik. should rest se
Bogert, supra note 7, and Donley, Some Problems in the Collection of Chec.s (1932) 33
Wasr. VA. L. Q. 195; Comment, 6 TuLANE LAw Ry. 643, 653; Comment (1925) 35 YMun
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Nevertheless, the grant of preferred claims against the assets of insolvent national
banks, so attempted to be achieved by the Code, remains a matter for the con-
sideration of Congress,40 not the state legislatures.
APPLICATION OF BULK SALES ACT TO CHATTEL MORTGAGES
AN automobile dealer gave a creditor a chattel mortgage on all the supplies and
equipment of his business in consideration that the latter defer suit for sixty days on
a note past due. At the expiration of this period, the mortgagee took possession, and
three weeks later the mortgagor was adjudged a bankrupt. A second creditor, the
trustee in bankruptcy intervening,1 brought suit to subject the property to a trust
in the hands of the mortgagee, on the ground that the chattel mortgage was in fact
a sale or transfer within the Ohio Bulk Sales Act,2 and was void for failure to comply
at any time with the requirements of the statute as to furnishing lists of creditors
and giving notice to them. It was held that, despite the fact that title passed under
the mortgage to the mortgagee, the instrument constituted merely a lien on the prop-
erty and not a sale, transfer, or assignment within the meaning of the act, and that
as chattel mortgages are specifically provided for by the particular provisions of the
state chattel mortgage recording act,3 they would not in any case come within the
general terms of the Bulk Sales Act.4
The present holding appears to conform to the usual view that such a chattel
mortgage of goods and, or, fixtures in bulk is not a "sale, transfer, or assignment"
within the meaning of those terms as used in bulk sales statutes.5 The reasons
L. J. 627; Comment (1926) 75 U. or PA. L. REv. 69; see also Anheuser-Busch Brewing
Ass'n v. Clayton, 56 Fed. 759 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893).
40. So far Congress has had occasion to consider only a limited phase of the subject.
Hearings Before the Committee on Banks and Currency on H. R. 5634, 70th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1930). It is likely that more definite action will be taken when the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has completed its work on the Uniform Bank Col-
lection Code. See note 20, supra.
1. The suit was obviously not maintainable by the creditor in his own right, since
brought after the appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy. CoLLIEr, BANxRupTCv (Gil-
bert's ed. 1934) § 1395; 5 REmINGToN, BAN cRUPT (3d ed. 1923) § 2222. The court, how-
ever, permitted the trustee to adopt the original plaintiff's cause of action. Cf. Norton
v. Steinfeld, 36 Ariz. 536, 288 Pac. 3 (1930); Van Camp v. McCulley, Trustee, 89 Ohio
St. 1, 104 N. E. 1004 (1913).
2. Omao GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) §§ 11102-11103(1). This statute is characteristic. It
contains the usual provisions requiring that the transferee of a merchant's goods and, or,
fixtures in bulk demand and receive from the transferor a list of the transferor's credit-
ors with the amount of the indebtedness due to each, and that he seasonably send notice
of the transfer to each creditor. Failure to comply with these requirements makes the
transfer void, or presumptively so, as to existing creditors. The period of notice required
varies among the states. See Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Economic Adjustment
(1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 72; Keysor, Bulk Sales Acts in (1914) WASnINOTON UNIvra.
srry STuDiEs 59.
3. Omo GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) §§ 8560-1.
4. Winters National Bank and Trust Co. v. Midland Acceptance Corp., 47 Ohio App.
324, 191 N. E. 889 (1934).
5. In re George Seton Thompson Co., 297 Fed. 934 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924); United States
v. Lankford, 3 F. (2d) 52 (E. D. Va. 1924) ; Farrow v. Farrow, 136 Ark. 140, 206 S. W. 134
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advanced for this determination, as ordinarily expressed, are that these statutes are
applicable only when a complete disposition of the entire interest of the vendor is
made, and that a mortgage, in any case, is not such a complete divestiture of title,
for even when the mortgage, by its terms or construction, purports to pass title to
the property, it merely gives the mortgagee security for an existing debt.7 Even sub-
sequent foreclosure and a taking of possession of the property have been held not to
create a complete sale or transfer within the statutes; 8 but an exception to this doc-
trine has been created where there was evidence of collusion and an intent to defraud
other creditors,9 as in the case of a release of the equity of redemption made imme-
diately after the execution and delivery of the mortgage.' 0 In at least three juris-
dictions,"1 however, the courts have held categorically that a chattel mortgage is a
"transfer"12 or a "sale or disposal'1 3 and passes such title or interest as will bring
it within the acts. It has been suggested that the difference between these decisions
may be explained by the fact that those states refusing to include a chattel mortgage
under a bulk sales act are "lien states"; that is, that they hold such an instrument to
constitute merely a lien as opposed to the common law doctrine that it conveys title
to the mortgagee, the view said to prevail in the states which do include the mort-
gage within the act.1 4 This theory does not find full support from the cases, inasmuch
as Arkansas, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, all so-called "title states,"1i have held
chattel mortgages to be exempt from the incidence of the act,10 while in Texas, a
"lien state,"' 7 the act has been applied to such transactions.
12
In general, the bulk sales acts appear to have been fairly effective in preventing
(1918); Slow v. Ohio Valley Roofing Co., 198 Ind. 190, 152 N. E. 820 (1926); Was-rman
v. McDonnell, 190 Mass. 326, 76 N. E. 959 (1906); Hannah and Hogg v. Richter Breing
Co., 149 Mich. 220, 112 N. W. 713 (1907); Farmers' Cooperative Co. v. Bank of Leeton,
319 Mo. 548, 4 S.W. (2d) 1068 (1928) ; Schwartz v. King Realty andnvestment Co, 94N.J.
Law 134, 109 At. 567 (1920); Appel Mercantile Co. v. Kirtland, 105 Neb. 494, 181 N. W.
151 (1920); Noble v. Ft. Smith Wholesale Grocery Co., 34 OkIa. 662, 127 Pac. 14 (1911);
Aristo Hosiery Co. Inc. v. Ramsbottom, 46 R. I. 505, 129 At. 503 (1925); Danids v. Pacific
Brewing and Malting Co., 86 Wash. 416, 150 Pac. 609 (1915).
6. Hannah and Hogg v. Richter Brewing Co., 149 Mich. 220, 112 N. W. 713 (1907);
Farmers' Cooperative Co. v. Bank of Leeton, 319 Mo. 54S, 4 S. W. (2d) 1063, (1923);
Noble v. Ft. Smith Wholesale Grocery Co., 34 Okla. 662, 127 Pac. 14 (1911).
7. Farrow v. Farrow, 136 Ark. 140, 206 S. W. 134 (1918); Aristo Hosiery Co. Inc. v.
Ramsbottom, 46 R. I. 505, 129 Ad. 503 (1925).
8. Farrow v. Farrow, 136 Ark. 140, 206 S. W. 134 (1918); Wasserman v. McDonnell,
190 Mass. 326, 76 N. E. 959 (1906); Farmers' Cooperative Co. v. Bank of Leeton, 319
Mo. 548, 4 S. W. (2d) 1068 (1928), overruling Olean Milling Co. v. Tyler, 203 Mo. App.
430, 235 S. W. 186 (1921) ; Appel Mercantile Co. v. Kirtland, 105 Neb. 494, 131 N. W. 151
(1920); Schwartz v. King Realty and Investment Co., 94 N. J. Law 134, 109 AU. 567
(1920).
9. Waldrep v. Exchange State Bank, S1 Okla. 162, 197 Pac. 509 (1921); see Schwartz
v. King Realty and Investment Co., 94 N. J. Law 134, 136, 109 Atl. 567 (1920).
10. 1ills v. Sullivan, 222 Mass. 587, 111 N. E. 605 (1916).
11. Linn County Bank v. Davis, 103 Kan. 672, 175 Pac. 972 (1918); Vaughan v. Tyler,
206 Mo. App. 1, 226 S. W. 1034 (1920); Beene v. National Liquor Co., 193 S. W. 596
(Tex. Civ. App. 1917). Missouri has, however, now. adopted the majority view, and in
Farmers' Cooperative Co. v. Bank of Leeton, 319 Mo. 548, 4 S. W. (2d) 1063 (1928),
specifically overruled its previous decisions which held that the Missouri Bulk Sales Act
included chattel mortgages.
12. Beene v. National Liquor Co., 198 S. W. 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
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conveyances of goods in bulk in fraud of creditors. However, since these statutes
are deemed to be in derogation of the common lawes they have been strictly con-
strued, thus leading to results such as that reached in the present case. This strict
interpretation, so excluding mortgages from their operation, is somewhat inconsist-
ent with the purpose of the acts; they are not intended to prohibit sales of every
description, but rather to provide safeguards against secret transactions intended
to defeat creditors' rights, by requirements of notice to individual creditors. If, by
means of a chattel mortgage unknown to most or all of the mortgagor's creditors, a
merchant can dispose of his entire stock of goods and fixtures, the protective fea-
tures of the bulk sales acts are to this extent rendered virtually ineffective. The
court in the instant case attempted to meet this argument by pointing out that ample
protection against such evasion is provided by specific legislation requiring recorda-
tion of chattel mortgages. Recordation statutes, however, are generally considered
to be merely a means of enabling the mortgagor to retain possession of the property
without invalidating the mortgage' 9 in states in which the right to possession passes
to the mortgagee. While recordation may perhaps be expected to serve a further
purpose in giving notice to future creditors and purchasers, 20 it could scarcely have
the effect of providing notice to existing creditors who ordinarily would not search
for a recordation; it is, therefore, an inadequate substitute for the notice required
under bulk sales acts. By executing a chattel mortgage and subsequently releasing
his equity of redemption, or permitting foreclosure, a merchant can dispose of his
goods freely under the present line of decisions. Of course, a question may be raised
as to the validity of such transactions under the federal bankruptcy act, since by
definition a mortgage may be an act of bankruptcy, 2 ' and may be voided if bank-
ruptcy proceedings are brought within four months of the recordation of the instru-
ment.22 But since recordation is probably of little value in giving notice, it would be
a relatively simple matter for the parties to wait four months from the time of re-
cording with the creditors wholly unaware of the proceedings, and if no bankruptcy
13. Linn County Bank v. Davis, 103 Kan. 672, 175 Pac. 972 (1918).
14. "In the cases holding that title remains in the mortgagor, it has been generally held
that a chattel mortgage is not a 'sale, transfer, or assignment.' In those states in which It
has been held that title does pass by the deed of trust or mortgage, the act has been held
to apply." United States v. Lankford, 3 F. (2d) 52, 54 (E. D. Va. 1924); Driscoll, The
"Sales in Bulk" Act (1929) 4 WAsu. L. Rav. 97, 104; Note (1921) 5 MI. L. REV. 557.
15. Perry County Bank v. Rankin, 73 Ark. 589, 86 S W. 279 (1905); Weeks v. Baker,
152 Mass. 20, 24 N. E. 905 (1890) ; Howard v. McPhail, 37 R I. 21, 91 At. 12 (1914).
16. Farrow v. Farrow, 136 Ark. 140, 206 S. W. 134, (1928); Wasserman v. McDonnell,
190 Mass. 326, 76 N. E. 959 (1906); Aristo Hosiery Co. Inc. v. Ramsbottom, 46 R. I. 9051
129 Atl. 503 (1925).
17. Soell v. Hadden, 85 Tex. 182, 19 S. W. 1087 (1892).
18. In re George Seton Thompson Co., 297 Fed. 934 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924).
19. 1 JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAES (6th ed. 1933) §190; SCtOULER, P-RSONZA. PROpErv
(5th ed. 1918) § 425; WALsri, MORTGAES (1934) 66.
20. Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation (1931) 31 COL. L. Ray. 617, 622,
21. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 1 (25) (1926); 30 STAT. 546 (1898), 11 U.
S. C. A. § 21 (a) (1) (1926); In re Pingel, 283 Fed. 664 (E. D. Mich. 1922).
22. 36 STAT. 842 (1910), 11 U.S. C.A. § 96 (1926). As the principal case involved a chat-
tel mortgage recorded only three months before the adjudication in bankruptcy, it IS diffi-
cult to see why an attempt was not made by the trustee to set the mortgage aside as a
preferential treatment under the Bankruptcy Act, rather than to rely on the uncertainty
of the Bulk Sales Act as a means of avoiding it.
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petition were brought within that period, the transfer could be completed by fore-
closure with immunity. To close this gap, Arkansas, California,2 4 Louisiana,25 and
Oklahoma 28 have incorporated express statutory provisions including chattel mort-
gages in bulk within their bulk sales acts, and New York-27 and Micbigan -s have
statutes providing that chattel mortgages on stocks of goods and merchandise shall
be treated just as sales in bulk. The rest of the states, however, have made no express
statutory provision against evasion through this device.
It may be admitted for the purpose of argument that bulk sales acts are at times
a detriment to business in that they slow up transfers of property, because of the
difficulty of notice. That this drag may operate to affect honest as well as dishonest
transfers and the operations of solvent as well as insolvent dealers is also apparent,
and it may seem unduly onerous to impose, in all cases of a mortgage in bulk, a duty
of notification in conformity with the bulk sales acts. But the purpose of the acts,
to suppress a well-defined type of fraudulent practice which was causing creditors
large losses in the marketing of goods, seems to outweigh these objections and this
further application of the acts seems desirable. Moreover, if conditions in the par-
ticular jurisdiction or business community are such that dishonest debtors are defeat-
ing the purpose of the bulk sales law by giving chattel mortgages instead of bills of
sale on their stocks of goods, then it should be the function of the courts to aid the
creditors, as has already been done in Kansas and Texas," by decisions applying the
acts to the mortgages even in the absence of statutory mandate. This approach to
the problem, seeking more completely to effectuate the purposes for which the acts
were passed, seems much more desirable than the achievement of a contrary result
reached through a strict interpretation of statute terminology or of title or lien
theories of mortgage.
POWER OF COURT TO PROTECT PATENT DECREE FR0ir MSUSE
A manufacturer of a patented cigarette lighter obtained an interlocutory decree
declaring his patent valid, enjoining a competitor from continuing patent infringe-
ments and ordering an accounting for damages resulting from past infringements.'
Pending final decree, the patentee maliciously misrepresented to the trade the scope
of the decree, through a sales campaign designed "to break" the defendant. Acting
upon the defendant's amended answer,2 the court invoked the doctrine of "unclean
hands" and vacated that much of the decree granting an injunction and account-
ing.3
23. A x. DiG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, Supp. 1927) §§ 4870-4872, as amended by Ark.
Acts 1929, no. 23, p. 41.
24. CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 3440.
25. La. Acts 1926, 464.
26. Omra. Coin. STAT. ANx. (Bunn, 1921) § 6029.
27. N. Y. L= LAW (1922) § 230 (a).
28. Mcnc. Coirp. LAWS (1929) § 9548-9.
1. Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham and Straus, Inc., 52 F. (2d) 951 (E. D. N. Y.
1931), aff'd, 61 F. (2d) 122 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
2. Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham and Straus, Inc., 62 F. (2d) 79 (C. C. A. 2d,
1932); Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham and Straus, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 292 (E. D. N. Y.
1933).
3. Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham and Straus, Inc., 70 F. (2d) 641 (C. C. A. 2d,
1934), cert. denied, 2 U. S. L. WEan 103, col. 3 (Oct. 8, 1934). L. Hand, J., di-ksented on
the ground that the plaintiffs conduct did not constitute unfair competition.
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Congress has attempted to stimulate scientific and mechanical progress by grant-
ing inventors a limited monopoly for the commercial exploitation of inventions,4
The intangible property rights thus created may be protected from infringement
either at law by a suit for damages5 or in equity by an injunction and accounting.0
Unless the patent has expired prior to commencement of an action for infringement,
the injunctive power of equity usually affords the more adequate relief to a patentee,
because the infringement of a patent is generally in the nature of a continuing
trespass and because the damages resulting therefrom are difficult to measure7
Further protection is available in that, within bounds of good faith, a patentee may
also vigorously defend his property rights by warning the trade of his patent and of
the alleged infringements.8 Methods of warning, however, if intended to intimidate
rivals by threats of infringement suits9 or by misrepresentation of a judicial deter-
mination of a patent right,10 constitute unfair competition and may themselves be
enjoined.1 '
If in the present case the plaintiff had pursued his course of malicious misrepre-
sentation subsequent to the term in which a final decree adjudicating the validity
of the patent and enjoining its infringement had been entered,12 his conduct would
have rendered him subject only to an injunction and accounting for damageslt
The status of the two parties would in that case have been clearly set forth in two
injunctions and the damages that each had caused to the other party would have
been determined. But since the plaintiff's misconduct occurred while the equity
4. 29 STAT. 692 (1897), 35 U. S. C. A. § 31 (1929).
5. 16 STAT. 207 (1870), 35 U. S. C. A. § 67 (1929); see Woodmanse and Hewitt Mfg,
Co. v. Williams, 68 Fed. 489 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895).
6. 29 STAT. 694 (1897), 42 STAT. 392 (1922), 35 U. S. C. A. § 70 (1929).
7. Coca-Cola v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 Fed. 720 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912).
8. 16 STAT. 203 (1870), 35 U. S. C. A. § 49 (1929) (notice required where article is
not marked); cf. Oil Conservation Engineering Co. v. Brooks Engineering Co., 52 F. (2d)
783 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); American Ball Co. v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 70 F. (2d) 579
(C. C. A. 8th, 1934); see Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation (1916) 29 HAnv.
L. REv. 640, 661.
9. Adriance, Platt and Co. v. National Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903);
Dittgen v. Racine Paper Goods Co., 164 Fed. 85 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1908); see FEDERAL
TRADE CommIssIoN, MEmoRANDum ON UNFAn COmPEITION AT THE Co.o0N LAW (1916)
141.
10. Asbestos Shingle, Slate and Sheathing Co. v. H. W. Johnsmanville Co., 189 Fed.
611 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911); Rollman Mfg. Co. v. Universal Hardware Works, 38 Fed.
568 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916); Adjusta Co. v. Alma Mfg. Co., 36 F. (2d) 105 (S. D. N, Y.
1929).
11. Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1888); A. B. Farquhar Co. v. National
Harrow Co., 102 Fed. 714 (C. C. A. 3d, 1900); Gerosa v. Apco Mfg. Co., 29 Fed. 19 (C.
C. A. 1st, 1924) (defendant granted injunction and accounting); General Talking Pictures
Corp. v. Stanley Co. of.America, 42 F. (2d) 904 (D. Del. 1930) (after patentee's decree
has been made final, court has power to enjoin misuse of decree).
12. Save in very exceptional circumstances or for clerical mistakes, a court of equity
may not set aside or vacate a final decree after the term in which it was entered. Cameron
v. Roberts, 3 Wheat. 591 (U. S. 1818); Sibbald v. United States, 12 Pet. 488 (LU. S, 1838);
In re Metropolitan Trust Co., 218 U. S. 312 (1910); DOBIE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928)
§ 194.
13. Cf. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Stanley Co. of America, 42 F. (2d) 904
(D. Del. 1930).
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court retained jurisdiction over the decree,14 the court had the power to vacate or
modify the decree, and thereby place upon the plaintiff a greater disadvantage.
The present decree declares the patent valid, but the protection of an injunction has
been taken away so far as the particular business competitor is concerned, 15 and
future protection must be found in the less satisfactory manner of successive suits
at law for future damages, as well as a suit at law to recover past damages.10
It is generally stated that the "unclean hands" doctrine applies only when a suitor
is guilty of inequitable conduct that affects the facts necessary to establish his cause
of action. 17 Since the plaintiff's rights in the instant case had already been deter-
mined before the occurrence of his illegal conduct, that conduct might appear not
to be connected with the cause of action, and in this respect the doctrine's applica-
tion can be said to be a deviation from precedent.1 8 This deviation appears harsh
in view of the fact that with comparative ease the court could dearly have set forth
the rights of the parties, thereby avoiding the imposition of a penalty that is not
measured in terms of actual damage,') but that results rather in a virtual forfeiture
of a valuable right. Although this same possible objection is given no weight in
the ordinary case where equity refuses to entertain a suit because of the plaintiff's
conduct, nevertheless it may well be that the harshness of the doctrine should rec-
ommend its restricted application.20
14. Interlocutory decrees, regardless of the term at which they were entered, are subject
to correction or abrogation until final disposition of the case. Fourniquet v. Perkins, 16
How. 82 (U. S. 1853); Lewers and Cook v. Atcherly, 222 U. S. 285 (1911); Simmons Co.
v. Grier Brothers Co., 258 U. S. 82 (1922); DOBIE, Frz axn. PRocmunm (1928) § 194.
15. The original decree was merely modified to the extent of denying the injunction
and accounting.
16. The refusal to exercise jurisdiction because of unclean hands does not go to the
merits, and thus an action at law is not barred. Carmen v. Fox Film Corp, 204 App.
Div. 776, 198 N. Y. Supp. 766 (1st Dep't, 1923). The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only
to a final decree, and not to an interlocutory decree. De Forest Radio Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. Westinghouse Electric and Mfg. Co., 13 F. (2d) 1014 (E. D. Pa. 1924).
Omission of a "without prejudice" clause is not necessarily fatal to an action at law. Gro-
blewski v. John Chmiell Co., 268 Fed. 240 (C. C. A. 1st, 1920); Carmen v. Fox Film
Corp., 204 App. Div. 776, 198 N. Y. Supp. 766 (1st Dep't, 1923). For a definite statement
of the status of the parties under a similar decree, see General Excavator Co. v. Keystone
Driller Co., 62 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932), aff'd, 290 U. S. 240 (1933). Whether the
remedy at law is available may be a matter of question, since the decree as modified adju-
dicates the patent's validity and infringement, but refuses to give patentee any relief. The
court might have believed that the damages each party suffered might offiet each other,
and that the defendant, realizing the patent's validity, would refrain from future infringe-
ment. While some degree of doubt is cast upon the rights of defendant, presumably he
has gained since he has been given the relief for which he asked.
17. Chute v. Wisconsin Chemical Co., 185 Fed. 115 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1911); Keystone
Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 62 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932), afj'd, 290 U. S.
240 (1933); Pitzele v. Cohn, 217 Ill. 30, 75 N. E. 392 (1905); see 1 Po,rmoy, EQunv
Ju-IsPRuDmNCE (4th ed. 1918) § 399.
18. Where, in order to obtain grounds for divorce, a husband conspired with his
brother and had him debauch his wife, the maxim of clean hands will not deprive the
husband of equitable relief since the wife's previous adultery gave the husband a right of
action of which nothing short of his voluntary surrender or similar matrimonial offenz2
could deprive him. Woodward v. Woodward, 41 N. J. Eq. 224, 4 Ad. 424 (1836).
19. (1927) 27 CoL. L. Rnv. 325.
20. The maxim does not reach a case where the cause of action is meritorious, and
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Yet, here the court is dealing with more than just the existence of inequitable
conduct on the part of the plaintiff. The present misrepresentations were directly
concerned with a court decree, and such conduct has always been considered peculiar-
ly within the control of the court whose decree is thus abused. 21 At common law
such conduct was sufficient to invoke contempt powers, although it has been held
that by statute this phase of control has been abolished.2 2 And in patent suits there
have been repeated statements to the effect that a court can go to great lengths, either
by modifying or vacating the decree, to punish misuse of its interlocutory decree, -Y
It may be argued, however, that abuse of a court decree is no more serious than
abuse of any other right of property, and the penalty therefore should be limited to
that provided by the law that makes the conduct illegal. Moreover, since it would
have been impossible to vacate the decree had its misuse occurred after it had
become final because of the ending of the present term, or had relief against the
plaintiff's practices been sought in a court whose decree was not in question, the
elements of time and place might seem to have undue effect. But the fact that the
power of a court to protect its decree is thus limited is hardly a reason to restrict
it further. Moreover, the power of an equity court to protect its decree has long
existed, and there is no more reason to regret its use in the present case than in any
other case where the plaintiff is, at the court's discretion, similarly left with impaired
rights.24 Abuse of such power can hardly be determined from the reported facts of
a case.
where, subsequent to suit brought, the complainant has been guilty of reprehensible con-
duct, but which does not "go to the cause of action." Chute v. Wisconsin Chemical Co.,
185 Fed. 115 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1911).
21. Asbestos Shingle, Slate and Sheathing Co. v. H. W. Johnsmanville Co.; Rollman
Mfg. Co. v. Universal Hardware Works, both supra note 10.
22. Asbestos Shingle, Slate and Sheathing Co. v. H. W. Johnsmanville Co., 189 Fed. 611
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911)
23. Asbestos Shingle, Slate and Sheathing Co. v. H. W. Johnsmanville Co.; Roliman
Mfg. Co. v. Universal Hardware Works, both supra note 10; Panay Horizontal Show Jar
Co. v. Aridor Co., 292 Fed. 858 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923). It may be noted, however, that the
present case is the first one in which the power to vacate or modify has been exercised, It is
interesting in relation to this point to compare the facts of the instant case and those of Roll-
man Mfg. Co. v. Universal Hardware Works, 238 Fed. 568 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1916); Alliance
Securities Co. v. De Villiers Co., 24 F. (2d) 530 (N. D. Ohio 1929); H. W. Peters v.
MacDonald, 5 F. Supp. 692 (D. Conn. 1934), rev'd, 72 F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
judge Hand's dissent illustrates the varied reactions that the judges have toward the
conduct of the plaintiff. It explains to a large extent the lack of uniformity among the
decisions as to what acts constitute unfair competition. Apparently in the instant case the
plaintiff's statement that he was out "to break Reilly" was given great weight by the
majority in determining plaintiff's m~alicious intent.
24. While Congress has seen fit to give limited monopolies to inventors, monopoly is
generally considered contrary to public policy and therefore should be restricted. By mis-
using the decree the plaintiff is in effect attempting to increase the scope of his monopoly.
The present decree might be considered as a penalty imposed by the court upon plaintlff
for his anti-social conduct.
Junici.L NOTICE BY ADMIISTRATIVE TmIuNALs
FRom the realization that there must be some limit to the facts of which proof at
trial is required there has developed the doctrine of judicial notice. Analytically,
absolute proof is impossible, and so the law, instead of adopting the "ultimate
reality" assumption of philosophy, has taken a common sense attitude and given
credit to the courts for knowledge of matters of common notoriety and general
experience.' judicial notice is useful in affording litigants a means of avoiding un-
necessary protraction of trials and its consequent expense. It has also proved a con-
venient device for affirmance by appellate courts of results which, while apparently
correct, are based on insufficient evidence and might otherwise be reversed on that
ground. Although there is practically no limit to the possible application of the
doctrine of judicial notice, the courts have failed to utilize this powerful weapon to
its full extent for the elimination of the technicalities of proof.2 But since the
principle is so simple and since the decision in each case refers only to a specific
fact or set of facts which is not likely to arise again, the decided cases are of little
value as precedents to the practitioner, who, for the sake of certainty, is willing to
prove many facts which might -well be judicially noticed. The case law on the subject
is therefore confused and poorly organized; the concept is loose, but perhaps its very
flexibility enhances its effective usefulness.
Ward's Case3 raises the problem of how far administrative tribunals are entitled
to avail themselves of this doctrine. In a proceeding before the workmen's com-
pensation board the evidence failed to establish that any of the injured's earnings
were required for support of his parents, although they lived under the same roof
and had no resources of their own. An award in which an allowance was made for
this item was nevertheless upheld on the ground that the board had the power to
make use of its practical knowledge and everyday experience.
Respect for the administrative ideal of avoiding time-consuming judicial methods of
fact-finding, would import a generous judicial attitude toward "judicial notice" by
administrative tribunals. Thus courts have given free rein to administrative applica-
tion of the rules of evidence, requiring only that the fundamental principles
guaranteeing fairness need be heeded; 4 and there is every reason to assume a
similar sympathy with the original legislative purpose on the specific question of
judicial notice. The whole theory of judicial notice rests ultimately on convenience
and expediency, and so its free use is particularly applicable to proceedings before
administrative tribunals since they are designed to be more efficient and to explore
narrower fields than the courts.
On the other hand, although they would not tamper with the nature of the pro-
ceedings before administrative tribunals, the courts must insist upon maintaining some
measure of control over results. They must be able to step in for the avowed
purpose of striking a proper balance between the conflicting desiderata of govern-
mental efficiency and protection of individual rights.5 The exercise of this appellate
jurisdiction entails the necessity of a record which, if it is to enable the court to
1. THAYER, A PzR.nxa Taa.TmSE ON Evr.acn (1898) 277; See 5 Wxri orr
EvmzxCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2565.
2. THAYER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 309.
3. 190 N. E. 25 (Mass. 1934).
4. Sm-aazxs, ADI sTRA E TRmuNAS AnD Tm Rur s or Ev micE (1933). At
pages 94 et seq., it is even suggested that the judicial attitude is too liberal. See 1 Wia-
moRE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 4b.




pass intelligently upon the administrative proceedings, must contain all of the facts
considered by the administrative tribunal. To meet this requirement, some sort of
restriction must be placed upon the doctrine of "judicial notice" by administrative
tribunals, such as incorporation by reference into the record of all facts noticed;
otherwise, to the argument that the finding of the board was based on insufficient
evidence it could always be answered that facts judicially noticed formed a sufficient
basis for the finding.6 Since much of the matter noticed by administrative tribunals
would be matters of expert knowledge with which the courts are unfamiliar, it would
seem necessary also to include in the record citation of the source material essential
to determine the facts noticed, if proper review is to be assured.
Furthermore, the idea that the truth can best be adduced by the trial technique,
as a result of which a conclusion is reached somewhere between the exaggerated cases
presented by each party, has received judicial sanction for so long a time and has
become so embodied in constitutional doctrine that administrative bodies can hardly
be giveui sufficient leeway to extend the doctrine of judicial notice so far as to deny
interested parties the effective hearing apparently compelled by "due process of law."7
The fact that one of the reasons for the creation of administrative tribunals is the
replacement of the jury by expert fact-finders, does not lull judicial suspicion of the
accuracy of the results of ex parte investigations, in which parties are not allowed to
present their case or to hear and explain or rebut the case against them.8 But the
restriction on the use of judicial notice, viz., requiring incorporation by reference into
the record of all facts noticed and citation of the source material essential for their
determination, is an ample safeguard to any private interests involved.
The proposition that administrative tribunals have the same power to notice facts
not proved as do the courts,9 subject only to the restriction mentioned above, besides
being able to notice much matter of expert knowledge not ordinarily noticed by
courts,' 0 reconciles the decisions and clears an apparent confusion in judicial expres-
sions on the subject. Thus notice of facts of common knowledge or capable of easy
determination has been approved almost without discussion, such as government
wartime control of sugar sales and consumption,1' rules and regulations of another
6. See Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1300, 1301; 1 Wiomona , op. cit. sispra note 1,
at § 4a, and articles there cited.
7. This was pointed out in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville
Rr. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93 (1913).
8. See Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal (1934) 47 HARV. L. IEV. 913.
9. United States v. Strauss Bros. & Co., 136 Fed. 185 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905); Anderson
v. Board of Dental Examiners of California, 27 Cal. App. 336, 149 Pac. 1006 (1915); Rich
v. McClure, 78 Cal. App. 209, 248 Pac. 275 (1926); see Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission, 81 Utah 286, 296, 17 P. (2d) 287, 290 (1932).
10. See Joynes v. Pennsylvania Rr. Co., 17 I. C. C. 361, 366 (1909): "The right which
courts have to take judicial notice of classes of facts is extended in the case of the Com-
mission to the entire range of its experience with transportation problems and embracea
all the knowledge that it has gathered from any source. In the solution of a particular
controversy it is entitled, in the general public interest, to use all available information."
See also Faris, Judicial Notice by Administrative Bodies (1928) 4 IND. L. J. 167, at 177.




administrative body,12 statute passed but not in effect,13 railroad rate established
by another sovereign power,14 reports on file with another administrative body,15
incorporation of cities,16 scientific facts' 7 and authorities,1 8 facts of geography and
topography,' 9 economic conditions, 20 and other matters of common knowledge.='
Some confusion is to be found, however, in the decisions regarding notice of matters
of expert knowledge, but they seem to indicate that if the manner of taking notice
be such as to meet the tests of affording a fair hearing and of reaching a result which
has some basis in the record, as would be the case if the restrictions above mentioned
were adhered to, administrative tribunals are free to take notice of all sorts of
reports, statistics, and other data on file with themea as well as the records of
12. Sciola's Case, 236 Mass. 407, 128 N. E. 666 (1920). This raises an interesting
discretionary question as to whether NRA Codes should receive judicial notice by such
bodies. A memorandum on the subject written by Mir. W. T. Croft, in the off6ce of the
Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, concludes that the provisions of in-
dividual codes should not be noticed, but only the fact that a code is in effect.
13. State ex. rel. Rabb v. Holmes, 196 Ind. 157, 147 N. E. 622 (192S).
14. Awbrey & Semple v. Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co., 17 1. C. C. 267
(1969).
15. People ex rel. Rome, W. & 0. Rr. v. Hicks, 105 N. Y. 198, 11 N. E. 653 (1887).
16. Rich v. McClure, 78 Cal. App. 209, 248 Pac. 275 (1926).
17. Wilcox v. Danner, 53 F. (2d) 711 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1931).
18. State Medical Board of Arkansas Medical Society v. McCrary, 95 Ark. 511, 130
S. W. 544 (1910) (standard medical works); Industrial Commission v. Big Six Coal Co.,
72 Colo. 377, 211 Pac. 361 (1922) (expectancy tables); Chiulla de Luca v. Board of Park
Commissioners of City of Hartford, 94 Conn. 7, 107 Ad. 611 (1919) (works on
lightning).
19. Hammond Lumber Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 156 1. C. C. 731, 734 (1929);
McRae v. Pine, 25 Cal. App. 594, 144 Pac. 983 (1914); Broyles v. Mahon, 72 Cal. App.
484, 237 Pac. 763 (1925); Rich v. McClure, 78 Cal. App. 209, 248 Pac. 275 (1926);
Hackney v. Elliott, 23 N. D. 373, 137 N. W. 433 (1912).
20. Pacific Lumber Co. v. Northwestern Pacific Rr. Co., 51 I. C. C. 738, 771 (1913);
Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Co., Inc. v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 183 L C.
C. 496, 497 (1932); California Growers' & Shippers' Protective League v. Southern Pacific
Co., 185 I. C. C. 299, 322 (1932); Consolidated Southwestern Cases, 194 L C. C. 381, 386
(1933).
21. Krusi v. United States, 1 Ct. Cust. App. 168 (1911) (appliqued collars); Canned
Goods in Southern Territory, 179 I. C. C. 77, 99 (1931) (absence of competition between
malt and corn sirup).
22. Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673, 681 (1912); Charles A. Sanford v. WL-tern
Express Co., 16 I. C. C. 32, 36 (1909); Oklahoma Cottonseed Crushers' Association v.
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co., 39 I. C. C. 497 (1916); Homan v. Board of Dental
Examiners of California, 202 Cal. 593, 262 Pac. 324 (1927); In re Carroll, 225 MaLL_. 203,
114 N. E. 285 (1916); People ex rel. Penny v. Board of Excise of City of Utica, 17 Misc.
Rep. 98, 40 N. Y. Supp. 741 (Co. Ct. 1896); Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 156 Wis. 47, 145 N. W. 216 (1914), approved in (1914) 27 Hmv. L. REv. 633;
see Wells v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 262 S. W. 70, 71 (Mo. App. 1924). But d.
United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274 (1924); Illinois Central R.
Co. v. Railroad Commission of Kentucky, 1 F. (2d) SoS, 806 (E. D. Ky. 1923); West
Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 42 F. (2d) 899 (N. D. Ohio 1928),
approved in (1931) 29 TINcH. L. REv. 765 (all holding orders void because not supported
by the record).
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previous cases28 and perhaps even their accumulated administrative experience, 2 4
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OP RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION
ANY certainty as to the judicial sanction of retrospective, or retroactive, legislation is
impossible, since no positive tests have been developed by the courts for discrimin-
ating between the permissible and the non-permissible.' The decisions in actions test-
ing the constitutionality of such laws are, consequently, in hopeless conflict. Thus,
it has been held that existing joint tenancies can2 and cannot 3 be changed into ten-
ancies in common by such legislation; that claims barred by statutes of limitation
can
4 
and cannot5 be revived; that misconduct occurring before the enactment of a
23. Lui Tse Chew v. Nagle, 15 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); Yee Chun v. Nagle,
35 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929); Ex parte Keizo Kamiyama, 44 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A.
9th, 1930); Ex parte Masamichi Ikeda, 68 F. (2d) 276 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); Wlckwire
Steel Co. v. New York Central & Hudson River Rr. Co., 30 I. C. C. 415, 424 (1914);
Board of Trade of Kansas City v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 34 1, C, C. 208,
209 (1915); Benton v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 74 Cal. App. 411,
240 Pac. 1021 (1925); Gillis v. Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania, 105 Pa. Super.
389, 161 Atl. 563 (1932); see McKaig v. Jordan, 172 Ind. 84, 87, 87 N. E. 974, 975 (1909).
But cf. New York Merchandise Co. v. United States, 13 Ct. Cust. App. 494, 497 (1926).
24. Halpern v. Andrews, 21 F. (2d) 969 (E. D. Pa. 1927); Swift & Co. v. Chicago
& Alton Rr. Co., 16 I. C. C. 426, 429 (1909); New England Divisions, 62 I. C. C. 513, 516
(1921); Excess Income of St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co., 124 I. C. C. 3, 34 (1927); Car-
load Traffic Between Industries in the Chicago District, 174 I. C. C. 111, 116 (1931); In
re Walsh, 227 Mass. 341, 116 N. E. 496 (1917); O'Reilly's Case, 265 Mass. 456, 164 N. E,
440 (1929); Carmossina's Case, 268 Mass. 35, 167 N. E. 350 (1929); Steenerson v. Great
Northern Ry. Co. 69 Minn. 353, 72 N. W. 713 (1897); City of Elizabeth v. Board of
Public Utility Commissioners, 99 N. J. Law 496, 123 Atl. 358 (1924); Hoffman v. Public
Service Commission, 99 Pa. Super. 417 (1930); see Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Inter-
state Commerce Commission, 194 Fed. 449, 457 (Com. Ct. 1911). Contra: Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Commerce Commission, 335 Ill. 624, 167 N. E. 831 (1929); Los
Angeles & S. L. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 81 Utah 286, 17 P. (2d) 287 (1932).
1. Shulman, Retroactive Legislation in (1934) 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA SOCIAL SciEncs 355, A
retrospective law is generally considered to be one that relates back to, and gives to, a previous
transaction some different legal effect from that which it had when it occurred. Gladney v.
Syndor, 172 Mo. 318, 72 S. W. 554 (1903). The terms retrospective and retroactive are used
technically to indicate laws referring to civil matters, as distinguished from ex post facto
laws, which relate only to criminal matters. Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S.
140 (1910).
2. Wildes v. Vanvoorhis, 81 Mass. 139 (1860); Miller v. Dennett, 6 N. H. 109 (1833);
Bambaugh v. Bambaugh, 11 S. & R. 190 (Pa. 1824).
3. Greer v. Blanchar, 40 Cal. 194 (1870); Butte & Boston Consol. Mining Co. v. Mon-
tana Ore Purchasing Co., 25 Mont. 41 (1901); Shell v. Matteson, 81 Minn. 38, 83 N. W.
491 (1900).
4. Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620 (1885); Hulbert v. Clark, 128 N. Y. 295, 28 N. E.
638 (1891); Bender v. Crawford, 33 Tex. 745 (1870).
5. Floyd v. Wilson, 171 Ala. 139, 54 So. 528 (1911); Lawrence v. City of Louisville,
96 Ky. 595, 29 S. W. 450 (1895) ; Moore v. State, 43 N. J. Law 203 (1881).
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divorce statute, making such misconduct ground for divorce, cane and cannot7 be so
used; that judicial acts ineffective because of irregularities in procedure mays and
may not9 be cured; that laws validating invalid municipal improvements are1o and
are not"1 effectual; that statutes nullifying existing attachment liens are 2 and are
not' 3 constitutional; that married women's deeds may' 4 and may not20 be validated;
that curative laws can' 6 and cannot 17 correct formal defects in proceedings adjudged
void by prior final judgments; and that wherever the legislature could have dispensed
with a requirement originally, it could 18 and could not 0 heal, by subsequent legis-
lation, the omission to perform it. It is, thus, clear that mere retrospectivity is not,
of itself, a bar to a statute's validity.-0
6. Elliott v. Elliott, 38 Md. 357 (1873); Carson v. Carson, 40 Aiss. 349 (1866); Cole
v. Cole, 27 Wis. 531 (1871).
7. Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 380 (1839) ; Greenlaw v. Greenlaw, 12 N. H. 20D, 203 (1841);
Dickinson v. Dickinson, 7 N. C. 327 (1819).
8. Norton v. Pettibone, 7 Conn. 319 (1329) ; Farnsworth Loan & Realty Co. v. Common-
wealth Title Insurance & Trust Co., 84 Minn. 62, 86 N. W. 877 (1901)
9. People v. Wabash Rr. Co., 311 Ill. 579, 143 N. E. 483 (1924); Finders v. Bodlc, 53
Neb. 57, 78 N. W. 480 (1899); Helming v. Forrester, 87 Neb. 438, 127 N. W. 373 (1910);
Draper v. Clayton, 87 Neb. 443, 127 N. W. 369 (1910).
10. Spaulding v. Nourse, 143 Mass. 490, 10 N. E. 179 (1887); Adams v. Cook, 245
Mass. 543, 139 N. E. 803 (1923) ; Tifft v. Buffalo, 82 N. Y. 204 (1880).
11. Evans v. City of Denver, 26 Colo. 193, 57 Pac. 696 (1899); Hasbrouck v. City of
Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37 (1860).
12. McFaddin v. Evans-Snider-Buell Co, 185 U. S. 505 (1902).
13. Steger v. Traveling Men's Building and Loan Association, 203 Ill. 236, 70 N. E. 236
(1904).
14. Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88 (U. S. 1834); Downs v. Blount, 170 Fed. 15 (C. C. A.
5th, 1909); Downs v. Peterson, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 135, 99 S. W. 751 (1907).
15. Alabama Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Boykin, 38 Ala. 510 (1863); RuselU v. Rum-
sey, 35 1lL. 362 (1864) ; Klumpp v. Stanley, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 239, 113 S. W. 602 (1903).
16. Richman v. Supervisors of Muscatine County, 77 Iowa 513, 42 N. W. 422 (1839);
Gibson v. Sherman County, 97 Neb. 79, 149 N. W. 107 (1914); Nottage v. City of Portland,
35 Ore. 539, 58 Pac. 883 (1899); Donnelly v. City of Pittsburgh, 147 Pa. St. 348, 23 AUt.
394 (1892).
17. McManus v. Hornaday, 124 Iowa 267, 100 N. W. 33 (1904); Moser v. White, 29
Mich. 59 (1874); Cowen v. State, 101 Ohio St. 387, 129 N. E. 719 (1920).
18. Sidway v. Lawson, 58 Ark. 117, 23 S. W. 648 (1893); Bowne v. Ide, 109 Conn. 307,
147 Atl. 4 (1929); People v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rr. Co., 323 Ill. 536, 154 N. E. 463 (1926);
Richman v. Supervisors of Muscatine County, 77 Iowa 513, 42 N. W. 422 (1889); Matter of
Sticknoth, 7 Nev. 223 (1872).
19. McCord v. Sullivan, 85 Minn. 344, 88 N. W. 989 (1902); Olsen v. Cash, 98 Drnu. 4,
107 N. W. 557 (1906).
20. Yet, from the beginning, retrospective laws have been objectives of suspicion in this
country. Coo=xv, CoNsrn0trrNAL LnrrATioxs (4th ed. 1927) 772; 1 KETi Co=-ai rAnMS
(Holmes' ed. 1873) 515; SToRy, CoNsrnrunio. (5th ed. 1833) §1398. The historical bas s for
this distrust have variously been suggested to be the eighteenth century political philo-ophy
which regarded security as the chief objective of government, the stigma attached to such
statutes from their popular association with oppressive ex post facto laws and bilh of attain-
der, the fear of statutory impairment of the obligation of contract, and the desire to frustrate
special legislation. See generally Smith, Retrospeztive Laws and Vested Rights (1928) 6 To.
L. REv. 409.
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The arguments on the legality of retrospective legislation have been impressive in
variety, but unconvincing in substance. The laws have been attacked, in some deci.
sions, as an impairment of various "vested" rights; 21 while in others they have been
sustained on the ground that there could be no "vested" right in any given mode of
procedure,22 in the existing laws in any legal defense,24 or, more broadly, that nc
one could have a "vested" right to do wrong.25 Some courts, fearing legislative
"encroachment" on the judicial function, have denied the validity of such statutes in
asserting that it is a judicial, not legislative, problem to declare what individual
rights are or have been 26 and that retrospective laws impinge on the concept of sep-
aration of powers. To this the reply has been made that the legislature is merely
acting within its own province in settling vexatious matters in order to give effect
to the intentions of the parties, thus doing equity and preventing needless litiga-
tion.27 In antithesis to holdings that certain retrospective laws are unconstitutional
because of their impairment of the obligations of contract,28 is the conclusion that
such laws usually strengthen rather than impair the contracts affected, since usually
they destroy only the unjust legal right of a person to avoid his contract, a right no
constitutional provision was ever designed to protect.29 A nebulous distinction is
also drawn between "jurisdictional" and "non-jurisdictional" defects, some courts
declaring such legislation unconstitutional as an attempt to cure proceedings void
because of failure of jurisdiction,30 and others sustaining similar statutes on the
ground that the irregularities corrected were non-jurisdictional and, thus, the acts
21. Preveslin v. Derby & A. Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 151 Atl. 518 (1930); Rus-
sell v. Rumsey, 35 Ill. 362 (1864); People v. Prather, 343 Ill. 443, 175 N. E. 658 (1931);
Lawrence v. City of Louisville, 96 Ky. 595, 29 S. W. 450 (1895); Helming v. Forrester, 87
Neb. 438, 127 N. W. 373 (1910); Anderson v. Lemkuhl, 119 Neb. 451, 229 N. W. 773 (1930);
Matter of Pell, 171 N. Y. 48, 63 N. E. 789 (1902).
22. Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142 (1922).
23. Arnold & Murdock Co. v. Industrial Commission, 314 Ill. 251, 145 N. E. 342 (1924);
Harsha v. Detroit, 261 Mich. 586, 246 N. W. 849 (1933).
24. Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143 (1883); Farnsworth Loan & Realty Co. v. Common-
wealth Title Insurance & Trust Co., 84 Minn. 62, 86 N. W. 877 (1901); Tifft v, Buffalo,
w2 N. Y. 204 (1880).
25. Downs v. Blount, 170 Fed. 15 (C. C. A. 5th, 1909); Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn.
209 (1822) ; Matter of Sticknoth, 7 Nev. 223 (1872).
26. Alabama Life Insurance and Trust Co. v. Boykin, 38 Ala. 510 (1863); Lindsay v.
U. S. Savings & Loan Co., 120 Ala. 156, 24 So. 171 (1897); Sidway v. Lawson, 58 Ark. 117,
23 S. W. 648 (1893); Preveslin v. Derby & A. Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 151 AtI. 518
(1930); Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen 361 (Mass. 1861).
27. Steger v. Traveling Men's Building and Loan Association, 208 Ill. 236, 70 N. E. 236
(1904); Cookerly v. Duncan, 87 Ind. 332 (1882); Chesnut v. Shane's Lessee, 16 Ohio 599
(1847).
28. Preveslin v. Derby & A. Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 151 Atl. 518 (1930); Smolen
v. Industrial Commission, 234 Ill. 32, 154 N. E. 441 (1926); Traveler's Insurance Co. v.
•Ohler, 119 Neb. 121, 227 N. W. 449 (1929).
29. Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143, 151 (1883); Steger v. Traveling Men's Building and
Loan Association, 208 Ill. 236, 70 N. E. 236 (1904); Wildes v. Vanvoorhis, 81 Mass. 139
(1860) ; Brearly v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. 1001 (1911).
30. People v. Wabash Rr. Co., 311 Ill. 579, 143 N. E. 488 (1924) ; Anderson v. Lehmkuhl,
119 Neb. 451, 229 N. W. 773 (1930); Klumpp v. Stanley, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 239, 113 S. W.
t602 (1908).
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were not void but merely voidable.S3 Finally, many courts have seized upon the lack
of 'due process" of law as the basis for declaring retrospective statutes unconstitu-
tionaL32 But others, in contrast, have held that no "property" has been taken awayp
or that the law is a proper exercise of the police power.34 A mere glance at the
innumerable similar set-ups variously decided according to their equities, but invaria-
bly rationalized in the same terminology, is ample evidence that all such language is
chiefly of service in conveniently classifying decisions after they have been reached
on other grounds.
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of North Dakota 35 presents an interest-
ing method of judicial manipulation of bothersome retrospective legislation. Plaintiffs,
husband and wife, had become jointly indebted to a bank; the husband thereafter
requested a second loan, which was granted on the condition that he secure both
loans by a mortgage on the homestead property. This he did, but his wife's signature
on the mortgage was not acknowledged, as required by the homestead statute; "G nor,
in signing the mortgage, did she know that it was to secure the old as well as the
new loan. Nevertheless, the mortgage was recorded and, after a subsequent fore-
closure and sale, suit was brought by the mortgagors against the bank to cancel the
mortgage on the ground that it was void for lack of proper acknowledgment. The
defendant pleaded two identical curative statutes,37 enacted subsequent to the execu-
tion of the mortgage, and seeming to cure the defective acknowledgment by provid-
ing that the execution, acknowledgment, filing and recording of all deeds, mortgages,
and other instruments in writing affecting the title to real property in the state,
made in good faith, and recorded in the proper counties, should be thereafter legal
and valid for all purposes. The court, however, declared the mortgage void, but in
doing so did not find it necessary to hold the retrospective statutes unconstitutional.
It merely refused to apply them.38 It was held, nevertheless, that the title to the
homestead could not be quieted in the plaintiffs until they had satisfied the equitable
lien, constituted by the moral obligation to pay the second loan, which probably
would not have been made had not a mortgage been executed by both husband and
wife; 39 and that, if the lien were not satisfied, the property would be ordered sold.
31. Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143 (1883); McSurely v. McGreiv, 140 Iowa 163, 118
N. W. 415 (1903); Farnsworth Loan & Realty Co. v. Commonwealth Title Insurance &
Trust Co., 34 Min. 62, 86 N. W. 877 (1901); Tifft v. Buffalo, 82 N. Y. 204 (1330); Gibson v.
Sherman County, 97 Neb. 79, 149 N. W. 107 (1914).
32. Mulker v. Harlem Rr. Co., 197 U. S. 544 (1905); Alabama Life Insurance & Trust
Co. v. Boykin, 33 Ala. 510 (1863); Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen 361 (Mass. 1861); LivingAton
v. Livingston, 74 App. Div. 261, 77 N. Y. Supp. 476 (1st Dep't, 1902), afI'd, 173 N. Y. 377,
66 N. E. 123 (1903).
33. Ewell v. Daggs, log U. S. 143. (1883); Brearly v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E.
1001 (1911); cf. Comment (1925) 25 CoL. L Rtv. 470.
34. Chicago, B. & Q. Rr. Co. v. State, 47 Neb. 549, 66 N. W. 624 (1896).
35. Acklin v. First National Bank of Mott, 264 N. W. 769 (N. D. 1934).
36. N. D. Laws 1913, §§ 5607, 5603; N. D. Laws 1923, c. 229.
37. N. D. Laws 1927, c. 275; N. D. Laws 1931, c. 305.
38. Such was the method adopted by the court in Goodykoontz v. Olsen, 54 Iowa 174,
6 N. W. 263. (1880).
39. Moral persuasion, such as might be considered by a court of equity in determining
an estoppel, has often received consideration by the courts in deciding the validity of retro-
spective laws. Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143 (1883); Downs v. Blount, 170 Fed. 15 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1909); Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209 (1822); Matter of Sticknoth, 7 Nev.
223 (1872); Brearly v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. 1001 (1911).
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It might well be inferred that the result of the court's decision is actually to apply
the curative statutes to the second loan covered by the mortgage as the equities of
the case seemed to require; for this appears to be the effect of the threat to enter a
decree for the sale of the homestead unless the second loan was repaid. To this
extent the void mortgage has certainly been cured. But as regards the old, preexist-
ing loan, the curative statute has just as certainly been rendered inoperative. Bear-
ing in mind the desirability of this result, in view of the fact that the wife signed
the mortgage on her homestead without realizing that it was to be security for the
old loan as well as the new, it does seem that the court's method of avoiding the
application of the curative statutes without asserting their unconstitutionality in
meaningless terms is most commendable. The statutes thus remain to be invoked in
later cases when their operation may give effect to the bona fide intentions or reason-
able expectations of the parties.
LIABILITY OF SURETY ON ADMINISTRATION BOND FOR DEBT OWED BY PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE TO DECEASED
AT common law, where a debtor was named executor of his creditor the debt was
extinguished on the principle that the executor could not sue himself; the personal
action, once being suspended by the voluntary act of the party entitled to it, was
therefore entirely discharged,' even though the debtor died before he had a chance
to prove the will.2 But as against creditors the debt was discharged only if the
remaining assets of the estate were sufficient to pay their claims in full.8 A
distinction was drawn between the appointment of a debtor as executor and as admin-
istrator. The naming of an executor was said to be the free act of the creditor
himself, indicating his intention that the debt be released, whereas the appointment
of an administrator was an action of the ecclesiastical court, and in such case the
obligation was only suspended for the period of the debtor's administration, after
which an administrator de bonis non could recover upon the debt.
4
Chancery established a fiction to reach a contrary result. Under the equity rule
the debt was not discharged, but remained as an asset of the estate, and the admin-
istrator or executor was considered to have paid the money to himself and to have
it in his possession.5 Thus he was liable to account for it to the creditors, legateeso
1. Fryer v. Gildridge, Hobart 10 (1613); Cheetham v. Ward, 1 Bos. & Pul. 630 (1797);
Freakley v. Fox, 9 B. & C. 130 (1829); Jenkins v. Jenkins, [19281 2 K. B. $01; 2 WL-
-IA S, EXECUTORS (Parry & Cherry, 12th ed. 1930) 854; 2 WoERNER, A MEICAN LAW OF
AD nIITRATION (3d ed. 1923) § 311.
2. Wankford v. Wankford, I Salk. 299 (1699).
3. Dorchester v. Webb, Cro. Car. 372, 373 (1633); Holliday v. Boas, 1 Roll. Abr. 920
(1668) ; 2 WX=Lims, op. cit. supra note 1, at 855. Back of this rule there may have been
the general idea that all of the testator's personalty is available for his creditors, and there-
fore he ought not to be permitted to deprive them of this chose in action against the execu-
tor by post mortem discharge.
4. Sir John Nedham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 135a (1610); Bailey's Case, 2 Mod. 315 (1682);
2 WoERNE, loc. cit. supra note 1.
5. Field v. Clerk, 1 Rep. Ch. 242 (1663); Carey v. Goodinge, 3 Bro. C. C. 110 (1790);
Ingle v. Richards (No. 2), 28 Beav. 366 (1860); In re Hyslop, [1894] 3 Ch. 522; In re
Pink, [1912] 1 Ch. 498; Jenkins v. Jenkins, [1928] 2 K. B. 501, 507. This rule is based
"on the familiar principle that, when a creditor appoints his debtor his executor, the law
presumes that to have been done by the executor which it was his duty to do." Tarbell
v. Jewett, 129 Mass. 457, 459 (1880).
6. Brown v. Selwin, Cas. t. Talbot 240 (1734), aff'd, Selwin v. Brown, 3 Bro. P. C. 607
(1735).
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and next of kin,7 but he was permitted to rebut the claim against him by evidence
showing the intention of the testator to forgive the debt.8 The chancery rule has
generally been adopted in the United States.0 More than half the states have pro-
vided by statute that the debt is not discharged but must be treated as an asset of
the estate, to be accounted for by the personal representative.10 To facilitate the
enforcement of his obligation1 the fiction that the fiduciary had paid the debt and
held the proceeds as so much money on hand was continued."
A decided split of authority has arisen concerning the liability of sureties on the
bond of an executor or administrator for the latter's debt to the deceased. The
7. Carey v. Goodinge, 3 Bro. C. C. 110 (1790); Simmons v. Gutteridge, 13 Ves. 262
(1805).
8. The mere appointment of the debtor as executor does not alone constitute suffident
evidence of the testator's intention to forgive the debt; neither is parol evidence admis--
ble to establish such an intent in the will itself where the instrument is otherwise silent on
the point. Seiwin v. Brown, 3 Bro. P. C. 607 (1735). But documents, or parol evidence
indicating the continuing intention of the testator during his lifetime to discharge the
executor's obligation, can be adduced to prove the release of the debt. Strong v. Bird, L.
R. 18 Eq. 315 (1874); In re Applebee, [1891] 3 Ch. 422; cf. In re Greg, 11921] 2 Ch.
243.
9. Wachsmuth v. Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 241 Ill. 409, 89 N. E. 787 (1909); In re
Parker's Estate, 189 Iowa 1131, 179 N. W. 525 (1920); Hodge v. Hodge, 90 Me. S05, 38
AtL 535 (1897); Joseph v. Herzig, 198 N. Y. 456, 92 N. E. 103 (1910); Jones v. Willis, 72
Ohio St. 189, 74 N. E. 166 (1905); In re Hoya's Will, 173 Wis. 196, 180 N. W. 940 (1921).
10. AY-A. CODE ANsx. (ichlie, 1928) § 10592;. Asiz. REv. CODE Am.. (Struckmeyer,
1928) § 3961; Apr. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 75; CAL. Psoors CODE (Deer-
ing, 1931) § 602; CoLo. Aa .. STAT. (AMls, 1930) § 7874; Ksr. REv. STAT. A-,. (1923)
c. 22, § 528; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 3889; AID. Aim. CODE (Bagly, 1924) art. 93,
§§ 235, 236; Mliss. CODE Aim. (1930) § 1648; Mo. STAT. Amz. (Vernon, 1932)
§§ 100, 101; Nzv. Coax'. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 9688; N. H. Pun. L%ws (1926) c. 300,
§ 14; N. J. Comip. STAT. (1910) p. 2261, § 8; N. Y. SuRs. CT. Acr (1920) § 203; N. C.
CODE Amn. (Michie, 1931) § 58; N. D. Comx'. LAws Aimr. (1913) § 8716; Omo GM.. CODZ
(Page, Supp. 1931) § 10509-67; ORE. CODE ANn. (1930) § 11-305; PA. ST,%T. A.,.:. (Pardon,
1930) fit. 20, § 445; R. I. GEr. LAws (1923) c. 364, § 5; S. C. COD (Arichie, 1932) §
8967; I'm Ann. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 3451; UTAu Rnv. STAT. An. (1933) § 102-
7-5; VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 5377; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 44, art. 1, § 15; Wyo. Rlv.
STAT. ANn. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-2304.
11. Even under the codes there is apparently some doubt as to the fiduciary's power
to bring suit against himself. CLRE, CODE PM.AMna (1928) § 33. And if he could,
there is small chance of his doing so. He would either pay the debt into the estate funds
or else not pay it at all. For this reason it is probably desirable to retain the chancery
view that the debt has been paid, providing the fiction is not carried so far as to work
injustice. See in this regard the statement of Shaw, C. J., in Kinney v. Ensign, 35 Mass.
232, 236 (1836).
12. Stevens v. Gaylord, 11 Mlass. 256 (1814), the first case on the subject, declared at
269: "As soon as the debtor is appointed administrator, if he acknowledges the debt, he has
actually received so much money, and is answerable for it. This is the result with r.p,-t
to an executor; and the same reason applies to an administrator; as the same hand is to
receive and pay, and there is no ceremony to be performed in paying the debt, and no
mode of doing it, but by considering the money to be now in the hands of the party, in
his character of administrator." See, also, Winhiip v. Bass, 12 lass. 198 (1815).
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"Massachusetts doctrine,"'13 representing the minority rule, adheres to the view
that the sureties are liable regardless of the debtor's insolvency during the period of
administration. 14 The majority rule, on the contrary, holds the sureties responsible
for the debt only to the extent of the debtor's ability to pay;15 this liability attaches
if it appears to the court that the personal representative was solvent at any time
13. So called for its original adoption in that state, in Stevens v. Gaylord, 11 Mass. 256
(1814).
14. A recent case from Massachusetts affords a good example of the application of this
rule. The executor had, prior to the death of the testatrix, fraudulently applied to his own
purposes certain funds that had been given him to invest. After he had qualified as ex-
ecutor, upon the discovery of his fraud the court required him to file a surety bond, but he
was subsequently removed and an administrator de bonis non was appointed in his place.
In order to escape liability the surety company on the bond, being sued by the administra-
tor for the amount of the executor's debt to the testatrix, sought to introduce evidence to
show that the executor had been insolvent during the entire course of his administration.
This evidence was excluded at the trial, and on appeal from this ruling the decision was
affirmed on the ground that an executor's or administrator's surety is responsible for the
debt regardless of the assured's ability to pay. King v. Murray, 190 N. E. 526 (Mass. 1934).
Other cases in support of this rule are: Stevens v. Gaylord, 11 Mass. 256 (1814) ; Winshlp
v. Bass, 12 Mass. 198 (1815); Wright v. Lang, 66 Ala. 389 (1880); Treweek v. Howard,
105 Cal. 434, 39 Pac. 20 (1895); In re Jones' Estate, 115 Cal. App. 664, 2 P. (2d) 483
(1931) ; Lambrecht v. Gill, 57 Md. 240 (1881); Chapin v. Waters, 110 Mass. 195 (1872);
Choate v. Thorndike, 138 Mass. 371 (1885); Bassett v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 184 Mas.
210, 68 N. E. 205 (1903) ; judge of Probate v. Sulloway, 68 N. H. 511, 44 Ati. 720 (1896) ;
McCaughey v. Jacoby, 54 Ohio St. 487, 44 N. E. 231 (1896); United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. of Baltimore v. Jones, 22 Ohio App. 345, 153 N. E. 281 (1926); United
Brethren First Church of Eugene v. Akin, 45 Ore. 247, 77 Pac. 748 (1904); Jacobs v.
Woodside, 6 S. C. 490 (1875); Twitty v. Houser, 7 S. C. 153 (1875).
15. Davenport v. Richards, 16 Conn. 310, 316 (1844) (implying that the debtor-
executor's insolvency would be a good defense to an action upon the bond); Estate of
Branco, 27 Haw. 655 (1923), aff'd sub nom. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co, v.
Vicars, 10 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); McEwen v. Fletcher, 164 Iowa 517, 146 N. W.
1 (1914); Buckel v. Smith's Adm'r, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 991, 82 S. W. 1001 (1904); Costlgan
v. Kraus, 158 Ky. 818, 166 S. W. 755 (1914); Sanders v. Dodge, 140 Mich. 236, 103 N. W.
597 (1905); State ex rel. Welch v. Morrison, 244 Mo. 193, 148 S. W. 907 (1912); In re
Howell's Estate, 66 Neb. 575, 92 N. W. 760 (1902); Harker v. Irck, 10 N. J. Eq. 269
(1854); Baucus v. Barr, 45 Hun 582 (N. Y. 1885), aff'd, 107 N. Y. 624, 13 N. E. 939
(1887); Keegan v. Smith, 60 App. Div. 168, 70 N. Y. Supp. 260 (1st Dep't, 1901), aff'd,
172 N. Y. 624, 65 N. E. 1118 (1902); Piper's Estate, 15 Pa. St. 533 (1850); Spurlock v.
Earles, 67 Tenn. 437 (1874); Lyon v. Osgood, 58 Vt. 707, 7 Atl. 5 (1886); State ex rel,
Farmer v. Citizens' Trust & Guaranty Co., 84 W. Va. 729, 100 S. E. 685 (1919). Call-
fornia has an unusual split of opinion, perhaps representing changing attitudes on the part
of the judges, but explained in terms of its statute, supra note 10. Since that statute
deals only with executors, requiring them to pay their debts to the deceased, the majority
rule, permitting the sureties to show the insolvency of the personal representative, is applied
in the case of administrators, In re Walker's Estate, 125 Cal. 242, 57 Pac. 991 (1899),
Sanchez v. Forster, 133 Cal. 614, 65 Pac. 1077 (1901), whereas the sureties of an executor
are held to an absolute liability, in accordance with the minority rule. Treweek v. Howard,
105 Cal. 434, 39 Pac. 20 (1895); In re Jones' Estate, 115 Cal. App. 664, 2 P. (2d) 483
(1931). For the other cases in point, see Note (1920) 8 A. L. R. 84.
The term "debt," as used in this connection, refers to a matured obligation. The surety
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during the course of his administration,10 and the burden of proving his insolvency is
upon him and his surety.17
The Massachusetts view is a logical outcome of the fiction that the personal repre-
sentative has paid the debt and holds the proceeds as so much money in his hands.
Some of the states that have sustained this rule, word their statutes in precisely such
terms.1 8 From the fiction that the debt has already been paid, it is but a short step
to hold that if the obligation is not in fact satisfied by the executor, he has failed in
his fiduciary duty of conserving the assets entrusted to him, for which his sureties
are liable. However, in the English cases the solvency of the debtor was unques-
tioned,19 and there appears to be no case in Chancery where an executor's or admin-
istrator's sureties were obliged to make good the default of the fiduciary on his debt
to the deceased. The majority rule in this country recognizes that in a case where
the personal representative is insolvent throughout his term of office, the chancery
rule can have no factual basis, and that since the existence of a fiduciary default is
entirely fictional, no ground exists for the surety's liability. Furthermore, it is rea-
soned that since the insolvency of an executor or administrator during the entire
period of administration discharges any fiduciary accountability to the estate for his
debt to the deceased,20 his sureties should have available to them the same defense
that may be employed by their principal. 21
It is difficult to choose between the two rules in general terms, because the oper-
ation of either will vary considerably with the particular case. But some of the argu-
ments made for the Massachusetts doctrine seem unsound. For example, the leading
case on that doctrine asked, rhetorically: "But how is the condition of the sureties
worse than if any other person had owed the same debt, and the administrator had
released the debtor without receiving payment, or upon taking a note payable to him-
self for the amount?" 22  The surety, however, does not guaranty the collectibility
of the debts of others owed to the estate; it undertakes only that the fiduciary will
faithfully perform his duties of pursuing claims and administering such assets as
come into his possession. If a third party indebted to the estate can not and there-
can not be held liable for the fiduciary's failure to pay his debt before maturity. So, if the
executor or administrator has been discharged of his administrative duties when the debt
to the deceased becomes due, the surety should be relieved from any responsibility for the
debtor's subsequent default. And if the fiduciary is insolvent when the obligation matures,
under the majority view this fact may be showm by the surety as a defense to its liability,
even though the debtor was solvent prior to maturity. Estate of Branco, 27 Haw. 655
(1923), affd sub nom. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Vicars, 10 F. (2d) 474
(C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
16. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Vicars, 10 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 9th,
1926); AlcEwen v. Fletcher, 164 Iowa 517, 146 N. W. 1 (1914).
17. In re Howell's Estate, 66 Neb. 575, 92 N. W. 760 (1902). The peronal represnta-
tive who fails to establish his continued inability to satisfy his debt to the deceased may
run the risk of imprisonment for contempt. In re Weaver's Estate, 174 At!. 905 (Pa. 1934).
18. California, Maryland, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Oregon. For the citations of their
respective statutes, see note 10, supra.
19. See, for example, Ingle v. Richards (No. 2), 28 Beav. 366 (1860), and In re Pink,
[1912] 1 Ch. 498.
20. Baucus v. Stover, 89 N. Y. 1 (1882); In re Howell's Estate, 66 Neb. 575, 92 N. W.
760 (1902). Presumably, however, the fiduciary would remain liable as an individual. In
re Walker's Estate, 125 Cal. 242, 57 Pac. 991 (1899).
21. 2 Wozauza, op. cit. supra note 1, § 255.
22. Stevens v. Gaylord, 11 Mlass. 256, at 270 (1814).
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fore does not pay his debt, the surety is not liable for the representative's failure to
collect what it is not possible with due diligence to obtain. 23 Consequently, to require
the surety to pay the fiduciary's debt despite the latter's hopeless insolvency places
it under an obligation far more stringent than that to which it is subjected in case
the debtor is a third party.
It has also been suggested that the majority view, in excusing the surety if the
personal representative is insolvent, may tend to promote dishonesty and to lower
the high standards of fiduciary integrity traditionally set by the courts.24 It may
be said with some force that a rule favoring the surety at the expense of the bene-
ficiaries is anomalous, since the basic purpose of the standards established by the
courts is to protect beneficiaries. But protection of the beneficiaries cannot be
unlimited, and the surety is entitled to some degree of consideration. The possibili.
ties of fraud and collusion will vary with each individual case, being dependent in
some measure upon the previous relationships of the various parties. If the per-
sonal representative feigns insolvency in order to escape or delay payment of his
debt, the Massachusetts view may prompt the surety to discover and expose the
fraud in order to compel the principal to pay and thereby avoid its own liability.
But the majority view would seem to carry a similar stimulus, since, while the pros-
pect of its liability would not be so certain, the surety would be responsible if the
fiduciary's concealed solvency were later disclosed, and it would therefore prefer to
have the debt paid by its principal. Perhaps the Massachusetts doctrine may be
slightly more effective than the majority rule in discouraging the concealment of
assets where the fiduciary and the surety are close friends. But an individual
fiduciary is more likely to be sympathetic with the beneficiaries than with the modern
compensated corporate surety. An individual administrator is usually one of the
beneficiaries, and, at least if the estate is intestate, closely related to the others;
and an individual executor is generally a relative, friend, or counselor of the recipi-
ents of the estate. Under such circumstances the Massachusetts view may permit
the personal representative to defraud the surety.25 Moreover, the possibility of
concealment of assets has little application to corporate fiduciaries, which are not
apt to be insolvent or to feign insolvency.
It has also been argued that since a solvent fiduciary will pay the debt himself,
the majority rule prohibits relief against the surety in the only situation where such
relief is necessary.26 But this argument ignores the possibilities that a solvent fiduci-
ary may not pay, and that a personal representative, insolvent at the time of his
accounting, may have been solvent during some part of the period of administra.
tion. In either case the surety will be liable. Yet in spite of the many arguments
against the Massachusetts rule, its application may in one respect be of practical
value. Fiduciaries who are insolvent are admittedly undesirable as representatives
23. Gay v. Grant, 105 N. C. 478, 11 S. E. 242 (1890); 2 & 3 WoEaER, op. cit, supra
note 1, §§ 255, 324, 522.
24. Sunderland, An Inroad upon Fiduciary Integrity (1906) 4 Micii. L. Rav. 349, 352.
25. Campbell v. Johnson, 41 Ohio St. 588 (1885), offers a good illustration of this kind
of scheme. A widow contrived with her insolvent son to obtain his appointment as
administrator of her husband's estate, which consisted solely of a debt of $3000 owed by
the son to his deceased father. The obvious purpose of the appointment was to collect
the $3000 from the administrator's surety, who had not been informed of the debt.
Although under the Ohio rule the administrator's insolvency would not have been available
as a defense to the surety, fortunately for him the fraud was sufficiently clear to forestall
any action upon the administration bond.
26. Judge of Probate v. Sulloway, 68 N. H. 511, 517, 44 At]. 720, 722 (1896).
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of estates, especially where a debt to the deceased creates a conflict in interest. The
Massachusetts rule indirectly tends to reduce the number of such fiduciaries; for in
jurisdictions where the rule is enforced, presumably the sureties who know of it will
in fact examine into the solvency of their principal as carefully as they theoretically
should, and will refuse to issue a bond for an insolvent representative.
The problem is essentially whether the risk arising out of the fiduciary's debt to
the deceased should be held within the terms of the surety's agreement. Adminis-
tration bonds are not likely to cover specifically an issue that appears so infrequent-
ly. The fairness of reading into such a bond liability for the debt of an insolvent
fiduciary will depend upon a number of variable factors. The individual gratuitous
surety is more apt to invoke the traditional sympathy of the courts than is the
compensated corporate surety. It is doubtful if even the latter, in giving a bond
covering fiduciary default, would envisage a liability as fictional as this, unless that
liability had been enforced by the courts in the jurisdiction for some time and the
surety retained vigilant attorneys. Perhaps a statute specifically enacting the Massa-
chusetts rule would put those regularly in the business on notice and in general have
beneficial results. But the majority rule indicates a natural reluctance on the part
of the courts, especially when the issue first arises in any jurisdiction, to impose
retroactively a liability that the surety probably did not contemplate as within the
terms of the bond.
RErATIV PioxrY oF WAGES AND TAx LiENS UNDER SECTON 64 or THE
BANKRUPTcY Act
IN distributing a bankrupt's estate the priority rights between taxes and wages
earned within three months of commencement of bankruptcy proceedings are ap-
parently provided by Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act. Subdivision (a) of this
Section, as originally enacted,' ordered the payment of all taxes in advance of the
payment of dividends to creditors. Subdivision (b) of the same section enumerated
the other debts which should enjoy priority, "except as herein provided," and placed
such wages fourth in order. In most instances it was unnecessary to determine the
relative ranking of taxes and wages since the assets of a bankrupt's estate are
normally sufficient to pay both claims. However, where the assets of such an estate
were so depleted that the abatement of either taxes or wages was necessary, the
language of the statute did not dearly indicate the intention of Congress in respect
to the order of their payment.
It was only clear from the statute that taxes were to be paid before "dividends
to creditors," and as used generally in the statute, "dividends to creditors" meant the
payments to be distributed to persons not entitled to priority. Wages, on the other
hand, were entitled to "priority" by Section 64(b), but the significance of a "priority"
was not stated. Some courts held that since the only requirement in regard to pay-
ment of taxes was that they precede payments to general creditors, they should be
paid after the priorities of Section 64(b)2 and hence after wages. 3 But other courts
1. 30 STAT. 563 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 104 (1926). The claim for wages was limited
to three hundred dollars for each claimant.
2. In re Jacobson, 263 Fed. 883 (C. C. A. 7th, 1920); Grr.naar's Cor.Lum, Bm uPrcv
(2d ed. 1931) 999.
3. In re West Coast Rubber Corporation, Inc., 283 Fed. 351 (N. D. Cal. 1922), rev'd,
290 Fed. 160 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923), aff'd, sub nom. Oliver v. United States, 263 U. S. 1
(1925); In re Enterprise Brass Foundry, 293 Fed. 69 (W. D. Wash. 1923), rev'd on the
strength of the Oliver case, 5 F. (2d) 1015 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
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held that taxes were to be paid before wages,4 some even going so far as to say that
since the provision for payment of taxes was ahead of and aloof from the provision
for priorities, they should precede all debts, including costs of administration as well
as wages.5 In 1925 the Supreme Court finally held that taxes should precede wages0
since there was no provision to the contrary, and since taxes were "civil obligations,"
not "personal conventions."17
The following year Congress made a number of changes in the Bankruptcy Act,
one of them being an amendment to Section 64 whereby wages were expressly
granted preference to "all taxes." s It thus seems plausible that Congress deemed it
desirable to safeguard recently earned wages even at the expense of the "civil
obligations" due to the governments. 9 But, although the result which Congress at-
tempted to achieve seems clear enough, the amendment did not fully effect it. In
Ingram v. Coos County,10 a bankrupt estate was subject to claims for taxes, wages,
and costs of administration, but there were not sufficient funds to satisfy the claims.
Folpwing the words of Section 64 as amended, the referee ordered that the trustee
pay first the costs of administration, then wages and abate the taxes. But the tax
in question was, by state statute, made a valid prior lien upon the property against
which it was assessed, and the District Court, affirmed in the Circuit Court of Appeals,
reversed the ordered payment, directing that the trustee pay first the tax, and then
cost of administration and abate the wages.
This apparently unexpected result is made possible by another conflict of interpre-
tation that has its inception in the wording of the relevant sections of the act prior
to 1926, which were only slightly changed in that year. By Section 67(d) of the
Act it was provided that liens given or accepted in good faith and for a present con-
sideration shall "not be affected" by the Act.." A few courts reasoned that the sec-
tion was merely to set forth the definition of a valid lien as distinguished from one that
was voidable in bankruptcy, while a provision in Section 64 for "debts having
priority by state or federal laws" denominated the order of their payment. On this
theory wages would receive priority over all liens.' 2 Other courts took a middle
ground and assumed that since liens were unaffected by the Act, they were prior to
4. In re Woulfe and Co., 239 Fed. 128 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917); In re Kittenplan, 285
Fed. 62 (S. D. N. Y. 1922); In re Waterman Mfg. Co., 291 Fed. 589 (D. Me. 1923); In re
A. E. Fountain, Inc., 295 Fed. 873 (S. D. N. Y. 1924); In re Essenkay Products Co.,
5 F. (2d) 668 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925).
5. See In re Prince and Walter, 131 Fed. 546, 550 (M. D. Pa. 1904); In re Welssman,
178 Fed. 115, 116 (D. Conn. 1910); In re Ashland Emery and Corundum Co., 229 Fed.
829, 831 (D. Mass. 1916).
6. Oliver v. United States, 268 U. S. 1 (1925).
7. See id. at 5.
8. 44 STAT. 666, 11 U. S. C. A. § 104 (1926). At the same time "$600" was sub-
stituted for "three hundred dollars" in Section 64(b).
9. Although taxes are indispensable to carry on the function of government, It Is,
nevertheless, arguable that wage earners should be given the greater protection. They are
persons ordinarily dependent upon their immediate earnings and are not likely to realize the
impending insolvency of their employers. See Guarantee Co. v, Title Guaranty Co., 224
U. S. 152, 160 (1912); In re Erie Lumber Co., 150 Fed. 817, 823 (S. D. Ga. 1906);
Manly v. Hood, 37 F. (2d) 212, 213 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
10. 71 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
11. 36 STAT. 842 (1910), 11 U. S. C. A. § 107 (1926).
12. In re Tebo, 101 Fed. 419 (D. W. Va. 1900); In re Consumers' Coffee Co., 151 Fed.
933 (E. D. Pa. 1907).
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the preferred claims of Section 64, but also held that Section 67(d) embraced only
contractual liens and not statutory liens, on the theory that statutory liens could
hardly be said to be "given in good faith" or "accepted for a present consideration."13
Most courts, however, reasoned that Section 64(b) merely applied to a few unsecured
debts which were to be given priority only after all valid Hens, statutory as well as
contractual, were satisfied.14  Prior to 1926 the diversity of these holdings vas
generally unimportant as far as wages and taxes were concerned, since taxes were gen-
erally paid before wages regardless of whether or not the taxes were a statutory lien.
But now that the Act dearly places wages before taxes, the reasoning that formerly
placed statutory liens before wages is applicable to defeat in part that expressed
priority. Where the priorities of Section 64 were held to precede liens, there Vwould ba
no difficulty, and the same is true where Section 67(d) was held to embrace only
contractual rather than both contractual and statutory liens.15  But where the
priorities of Section 64 were held to come after all liens, wages may now come before
ordinary taxes, but after lien taxes.' 0 Yet, some of these same courts provide that
the costs of administration of the estate shall be paid ahead of such liens. 17 These
claims, as well as those for wages, are included in Section 64(b), but since the court-
have taken the position that claims listed in that section do not precede liens, the
payment of administrative cost is justified on the different ground that it is not a
"debt of the bankrupt." The net result of this circuitous reasoning is merely to con-
dude that while some claims given priority by Section 64 do in fact have priority
over liens, wages do not. Thus in these jurisdictions a claim for wages will be prior
to an ordinary tax,' 8 but subsequent to a tax lien,19 and a tax lien may precede only
wages17 or may precede both wages and administrative expenses. 0
Section 64 apparently intends to avoid this very kind of conflict since it provides
13. Cf. In re Bennett, 153 Fed. 673 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907); In re Woulfe and Co., 239
Fed. 128 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917); In re Caledonia Coal Co., 254 Fed. 742 (E. D. Mich. 1913);
Manly v. Hood, 37 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930); Hogan, Priorities v. Liens in Ban-
raptcy (1914) 78 CENT. L. J. 313; Note (1910) 9 MIcH. L. REv. 146.
14. In re Yoke Vitrified Brick Co., 180 Fed. 235 (D. Kan. 1910); Courtney v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 219 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914); In re Rauch, 226 Fed. 9S2 (E. D. Va. 1915);
Lott v. Salsbury, 237 Fed. 191 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916).
15. Matter of Noble, 16 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 142 (N. D. Tex. 1930); Matter of Hall,
16 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 147 (N. D. Tex. 1930). Under this theory, in the event that by
state law a tax lien was intended to be superior to all mortgage or other contractual liens,
the lienor could be said to have voluntarily agreed to have his debt come after taxes, and
hence after wages, although where taxes are not prior to the mortgage, Section 67(d) would
place the mortgage ahead of wages. See Matter of Hall, supra, at 151.
16. In re Tresslar, 20 F. (2d) 663 (M. D. Ala. 1927); Ingram v. Coos County, 71 F.
(2d) 889 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
17. In re Tresslar, 20 F. (2d) 663 (M. D. Ala. 1927); see GrrEar's CoLLIt-, BA,.--
RIUiTC, (2d ed. 1931) 997.
18. See In re Brannon, 62 F. (2d) 959, 960 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
19. In re Tresslar, 20 F. (2d) 663 (M. D. Ala. 1927); In re Brannon, 62 F. (2d)
959 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933), rev'g 53 F. (2d) 401 (N. D. Tex. 1931); In re Dublin Veneer
Co., 1 F. Supp. 313 (S. D. Ga. 1932), aft'd, sub nom. Dunn v. Interstate Bond Co., 63 F.
(2d) 364 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Ingram v. Coos County, 71 F. (2d) 8S9 (C. C. A. 9th,
1934). In the following cases, wages have been held ahead of tax liens: Matter of Hall,
16 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 147 (N. D. Tex. 1930); In re Glover Casket Co., 1 F. Supp. 143 (N.
D. Ga. 1932); In re Baldwin, 4 F. Supp. 90 (M. D. Pa. 1933).
20. Ingram v. Coos County, 71 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
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for all priorities and the order of their payment, and since it does not indicate any
exceptions. The simplest interpretation, therefore, would be that Section 67(d) pro-
viding for liens has no reference to priority, but merely to the validity of liens, while
Section 64 alone determines priorities. Such a conclusion is re-enforced by a con-
sideration of Section 64(b) (7), which provides for debts having priority by state
or federal law. This provision logically seems to embrace lien claims, and to accord
them a position after the other priorities. But that this interpretation is not gen-
erally accepted 2' indicates that to accomplish such a result in respect to wages and
taxes will unfortunately necessitate a more direct statement of Congressional inten-
tion concerning provision for liens.
MUSICAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT By NEwSREELS
TnE application of statutes to situations unforeseen at the time of enactment has
been a constant source of embarrassment to the courts.' Too broad a construction of
a statute subjects the courts to the charge of usurping the legislative function, and
too narrow, the criticism that the legal system is not flexible enough to cope with the
increasing complexities of a modem dynamic civilization. The recent radical develop-
ment of possibilities in the performance of music has sharply focussed attention in
this respect upon the copyright acts. The novel copyright questions raised by radio
broadcasting are well known.2 Recently there appeared before the English Court of
Appeal the question of infringement of a copyrighted musical piece by reproduction
in a sound newsreel.3 The defendant newsreel company photographed with sound
the opening of an English naval school and among the scenes was one of the school-
boys marching in review before the Prince of Wales to the tune of a piece entitled
"Colonel Bogey." Twenty-eight bars of music, consuming about fifty seconds playing
time, were reproduced by the, defendant in its newsreel which was distributed for
exhibition by the co-defendant company. An injunction against further distribution
was denied the plaintiff, owner of the copyright, by the trial court. But the Court
of Appeal reversed declaring that proof of intentional infringement 4 and actual
21. The usual interpretation is to the effect that Section 64(b) embraces only un-
secured claims, since it mentions only claims to be paid "out of bankrupt estates," and
since property covered by a valid lien is not part of a bankrupt's estate. For example,
see In re Tresslar, 20 F. (2d) 663 (M. D. Ala. 1927) ; In re Cardwell, 52 F. (2d) 158 (S.
D. Tex. 1931); Ingram v. Coos County, 71 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934); cases cited
supra, note 14. It must be admitted that the different interpretations suggested would place
all taxes ahead of all liens, a result that can hardly be expected unles there is a more
specific statement requiring such treatment. However, the present problem as to taxes and
wages seems to be successfully met by the reasoning of the Federal District Court of the
Northern District of Texas, set out in note 15, supra.
1. See e.g., Remick & Co. v. American Accessories Co., 5 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 6th,
1925), cert. denied, 269 U. S. 556 (1925); M. G. M. Distributing Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co.,
59 F. (2d) 70, 76 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932).
2. Simpson, The Copyright Situation as Affecting Radio Broadcasting (1931) 9 N, Y. U.
L. Q. 180; Sprague, Copyright-Radio and the Jewell-LaSalle Case (1932) 3 Ant L. Rav.
417; Caldwell, Copyright Problems of Broadcasters (1932) 2 J. RADIO L. 287; (1932) 10
N. C. L. REv. 203.
3. Hawkes & Son, Ltd. v. Paramount Film Service, Ltd., 103 L. J. 281 (Ct. App. 1934),
also reported in (1934) 77 L. J. 373, and (1934) 177 L. T. 304.
4. Hanfstaengl v. Empire Palace, (1894) 3 Ch. 109.
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damage was unnecessary. Since the amount of the piece reproduced was sufficient
for recognition of the melody this was a substantial reproduction and an infringe-
ment under the Copyright Act.5 The newsreel presentation was, moreover, held not
to be a newspaper summary such as would be expressly exempt as a "fair dealing"
with the piece.6
The holding is one which ever alert copyright owners will not long overlook in the
United States where the potential market for license fees thus revealed is tremendous.7
The American Copyright Act is very similar in relevant provisions to the English
Act.8 And, in view of the recent radio cases, as long as there is a reproduction of
the composition, invocation of the Act cannot be avoided by the objection that
Congress had not anticipated such a situation.0 The danger of infringement and its
consequent practical difficulties in obtaining immediate authorization from the copy-
right owners, necessary for the expeditious carrying on of the newsreel business,
might be avoided only if the newsreel could avail itself of the fair dealing exemption
accorded news summaries. Thus, just as a newspaper might report in writing that a
certain song was played by the X band on a particular occasion, the newsreel may be
claimed to impart the same information by means of auditory as well as visual
sensations. The music is only incidental to, and a part of, the reporting of the event.
But the fact nevertheless remains that, although used to report the fact of having
been played, the music is mechanically recorded and now re-played. Even a news-
paper or newsmagazine is not privileged to print the bars of music.10 Functionally
dissimilar to the other strictly news reporting agencies, the news-periodicals, the
newsreel draws its audience not for news but primarily as an integral part of a
program of entertainment.11  If anything, the newsreel is similar in this purpose to
5. CoPYRIGHT AcT, 1 & 2 GEo. V, c. 46 (1911). A distributor and a producer, the
Olympic Kinematograph Laboratories, Ltd., were joined as defendants but relief vas
sought primarily against the latter. Both defendant companies were apparently owned
by one organization.
6. COPYRIGHT Acr, 1 & 2 GEe. V, c. 46, § 2 (1) (i) (1911), provides that "Any fair
dealing with any work for the purposes of . . . newspaper summary" shall not constitute
an infringement.
7. Protection of creative work was, until recently, comparatively slight. Comment
(1931) 20 CA=n. L. REv. 77, 79, n. 13. Associations to secure the rights of the creators
have developed with great rapidity and effectiveness until now a considerable portion of a
composer's income is derived from the sale, through the as-sociations, of performing rights.
Sns--ma, MusicAL COPYRGHnT (1932) c. 7, § 6; id. at 201.
8. 35 STAT. 1075, 1088 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. (1926). The exemption of newspaper sum-
maries would, however, have to be interpreted into the Act as a fair dealing. Cf. Sm rm,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 184.
9. Remick & Co. v. American Accessories Co., 5 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925), cert.
denied, 269 U. S. 556 (1925).
10. See Haviland Co. v. Doubleday & Co. (S. D. N. Y. 1930), reported in Smisrrm, op.
cit. supra note 7, at 184, 185; Hawkes & Son, Ltd. v. Paramount Film Service, Ltd, 103
L. J. 281, 287 (Ct. App. 1934).
11. A newsreel cannot pretend to the comprehensiveness in scope and detail nor to the
ready accessibility of the newspaper nor to the latter's reporting of events soon after ac-
currence which makes them news. And although the newsreel is similar to the news
magazine in that both summarize important news events some time after their occurence,
in a more or less entertaining manner, there is a fundamental difference in that the news




the radio broadcast. And the resemblance, fortified by the similarity in the tech-
niques of centralized transmission of actual performances 12 for groups of people and
for profit,' 3 provides a conceivable analogue for the imposition of liability for un-
authorized performance upon those concerned in the infringement by newsreel. Not
only is the broadcaster, in his energizing and transmitting the music, considered a
performer,9 apart from the artists performing in the studio, so as to fall under the
provisions of Section 1 (e) of the United States Copyright Act,8 but the reception of
the program for the delectation of paying guests also constitutes a performance. 14
Thus the producer and distributor might likewise be considered as jointly accomplish-
ing a somewhat delayed broadcast and hence liable as performers. The exhibitor's
function would be the reception of this "retarded broadcast" for his paying patrons
and hence also a performance.
But the liability of each of these parties can be placed more directly under the Act
without resort to the patently strained radio analogy. The exhibition is in itself
plainly a performance by the exhibitor. And if a performer's liability is sought to
be assessed against the producer and distributor, they may be regarded as having
contributed to the infringing performance since their purpose in making, distributing
and leasing the film was to accomplish its exhibition in public for commercial gain.18
Otherwise individual liability may be imposed upon the producer under the Act for
having made a "record" from which the thought of the composer may be repro.
duced. 16 There can be no doubt that there is a mechanical recording' 2 within the
terms of the Act. The substantiality of the recording and the fact that it cannot be
regarded as a news summary preclude exemption as a "fair dealing" Wqith the piece.
And the distributor, although only renting the film to the exhibitor, may well be
considered an individual infringer in violating the copyright owner's exclusive right
to "vend" the copyrighted work.17 The latter two grounds were those relied upon
in the principal case to grant relief against the producer and distributor. A blanket
license to perform, previously granted to the exhibitor by an organization which
controlled the copyright performance rights, not only protected him but prevented
recourse to the theory that the producer and distributor had contributed to his
performance as a basis for suit against them. The radio analogy was not sought
to be invoked to denominate their activities a separate unlicensed performance.
The popularity of newsreels and the frequent occurrence of musical reproductions
12. There are two types of sound motion pictures; one uses a disc record synchronized
with the pictures on the film, the other utilizes a 'track on the film by which sounds
are recorded by the variations in light vibrations. BROWN, TAL=nGo Picruazs (1931) 32;
FRANKjLI, SouND Pzcrupms (1929) c. 3; PAGE, MODER COMMUNICATiOns (1932) pt. V;
SnZrm, op. cit. supra note 7, c. 8.
13. A radio broadcaster is a performer for profit. Witmark & Sons v. Bamberger & Co.,
291 Fed. 776 (D. N. J. 1923).
14. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191 (1931); Simpson; Sprague, both
supra note 2; Comment (1931) 20 CALF. L. Rzv. 77; Comment (1931); 1 J. RADIo L. 367.
The result of this decision was that, as to the radio and musical copyright, more than one
person could be a performer in regard to the same piece at the same time. Cf. Remick
& Co. v. General Electric Co., 4 F. (2d) 160 (S. D. N. Y. 1924); Remick & Co. v. Gen-
eral Electric Co., 16 F. (2d) 829 (S. D. N. Y. 1926); Performing Right Society v.
Hammond's Brewery Co., 103 L. J. 210 (Ct. App. 1933).
15. Cf. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U. S. 55 (1911).
16. 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 1 (e) (1926). That the music is recorded
see note 12, supra.
17. 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 1 (a) (1926).
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therein make the danger of copyright infringement one of large proportions and
broad consequences. 18 It is doubtful that a producer, distributor or exhibitor, seek-
ing to avoid the difficulties of securing authorization from the copyright owner, would
care to risk suit for infringement' 0 or attempt to avoid infringement by substituting
the voice of an announcer in place of the music or by reducing the amount of the
music to an irrecognizable and therefore unsubstantial amount?3 Therefore, if the
rapidity of production, distribution and exhibition essential to the conduct of the
newsreel business is to be preserved,21 a facile and comprehensive system for securing
authorization of both performance and recordation must be made available. This
has already been provided to some extent with respect to performance. The American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, which controls the public performance
rights in the great bulk of American musical copyrights, virtually all currently played
pieces, has sold blanket performance licenses to all sound motion picture exhibitors. -2
But the ten per cent of existing American musical copyrights which are not controlled
by the Society constitute an ever present danger of infringement and suit by their
owners.= And if the pending suit -24 to dissolve the Society as a monopoly in violation
18. One of the classifications of typical newreel topics made in Littel, A Glance al th:e
Newsreels (1933) 30 Aimx. Mmc. 263, 267, contains "parades, processions, recessions, oc-
casions, dedications, commencements, junkets, funerals, field days, flower fetes, outinp,
reviews, ceremonies, tattoos, cornerstones, and jamborees" at most of which music in some
form would be played or sung.
19. Protective associations, organized to take over individual copyrights, effectively pro-
vide vigilant protection for the copyright owners and also insure better financial returns.
The largest one in the United States is the well-known American Society of Compo:er,
Authors, and Publishers, organized in 1914, which maintains a large and efficient corps of
detectives, experts and inspectors constantly on the alert for infringers of copyrights as-
signed to the Society. Every state has its own staff of representatives and counsl.
SHrAnm,. op. cit. supra note 7, at 224-225. Criticism of the thoroughness of the Society's
investigators has been made. Hearings Before Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 1923,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 79, 81, 82.
Under the U. S. CoPyniGHT AcT, in absence of proof of actual damages, the court must by
Section 25 (b) award minimum damages of q250 with the exception of certain sp-ecified
,cases. If there are more than 25 infringements damages may be as-sesed within the di-
cretion of the court at $10 for each infringement. jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. v. Buck, 283
IT. S. 202 (1931). Section 40 provides full costs must be allowed the prevailing party and
that the court in its discretion may award reasonable attorney's fees. Marks v. Leo Fekt,
8 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
20. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E. D. S. C. 1924), af'd, 2 F. (2d)
1020 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924).
21. Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theatre Co., 17 P. (2d) 294 (Utah, 1932).
22. If the radio analogy can successfully be invoked to hold the producer and distributor
as separate performers, then they too might obtain blanket performing licenses from the
Society. The Society's license would include, it is estimated, eighty to ninety per cent of
all musical copyrights in the United States. (1931) 1 J. RADro L. 367, 374.
23. A large broadcasting company, seeking as nearly complete protection as possible,
found it necessary to secure 265 licenses from organizations other than the Society and the
Associated Music Publishers. Caldwell, supra note 2, at 302. And even a blanket license
from the Society does not cover all of its compositions since it withdraws certain ones at
regular intervals. Id. at 301.
24. N. Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1934, at 15, col 3. Compare also 174th St. Amusement Co.
-v. Maxwell, 169 N. Y. Supp. 895 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E. D. Pa.
1922) ; Caldwell, supra note 2, at 303, 304.
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of the Sherman Act 25 is successful, no blanket performance licenses would be readily
available. Moreover, provision has not been made for a central organization from
which blanket licenses to record copyrighted pieces may be obtained. The contracts
of the Society with the individual publishers, authors, and composers who own the
copyrights authorize it to license only public performances. A movement, both
within and without the organization, to give the Society control over recording rights
as well, has borne no fruit.20 The newsreel producers, unable to determine in advance
what pieces might be played at an event filmed or to ascertain the identity of the
copyright owner and obtain authorization before releasing the film, are subjected to
the risk of suits for infringement by recording.27 Nor, where the piece has been
recorded previously in some other form, can they avail themselves of the statutory
right to make copies on payment of two cents for each such copy-record, To do so
they must have sent by registered mail notice to the copyright owner of intention to
reproduce the record.28 If the producers are to include recognizable music in the
newsreels, they must accept the risk of subsequent suits by copyright owners for
unauthorized copying as well as recording.29 The absence of a single, comprehensive
licensing system which would not thus embarrass the newsreel process, and the
practical conditions and legal difficulties which may make its attainment impossible,
emphasize the imperative need for appropriate action by Congress in revising the
Copyright Act to treat properly the new modes of musical presentation in a manner
beyond the avowed powers of the courts. 80
25. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-7 (1926).
26. This may be due to the arbitrary and dictatorial manner in which the Society is
said to have dealt with motion picture exhibitors, radio broadcasters and even its own
members. Cf. (1933) 7 (1) Fortune 27, 32.
27. 35 STAT. 1075, 1081 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. §§ 1 (e), 25 (1926).
28. 35 STAT. 1082 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 25 (e) (1926).
29. If the copyright owner has given no one authority to make a mechanical repro-
duction of his composition, or if he has issued a license to make phonograph records, for
instance, and the courts do not construe the making of a newsreel soundtrack as a "similar
use" within the meaning of Section 1 (e), the producer would be liable under Section 25
for actual damages and profits. The owner could also get injunctive relief against further
infringements. In lieu of actual damages and profits, he would be entitled by Section 25
to whatever the court should consider just damages, but which in no instance could be less
than $250 nor more than $5000. Where the copyright owner has previously granted authori-
zation to record his piece then, if the court will construe the making of a newsreel sound
track as a "similar use," the producer would be liable only for the two cent per copy
royalty if he has given statutory notice to the copyright owner. If he has not given such
notice his liability presumably would be the amount of the royalties involved and, in the
discretion of the court, three times that sum, in lieu of actual damages.
30. Attempts to obtain revision of the Copyright Act have been numerous. See Buck v.
Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 201, n. 10 (1931); Solberg, The Present Copyriglht
Situation (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 184; Comment (1933) 4 Ant L. Rav. 292.
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